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ABSTRACT
This dissertation covers different aspects of political institutions and fiscal policy in local
governments. The first essay examines the political consequences of an increase in the district
magnitude (the number of open seats) for legislatures. The second essay studies how the size of
a local legislature affects the size and composition of public spending. The third essay develops
and tests a theory of how transaction costs might affect the use of earmarked revenues by local
budgeting authorities. The last essay compares the relative impacts of factors that might make a
local government more likely to adopt own-source revenues. These questions are examined in
the context of Brazilian and US local governments. Individual chapter abstracts follow.
Chapter 1: Research has consistently identified district magnitude as an important institutional
factor in political competition. The most familiar of these formulations is Duverger’s
hypothesis, which argues that district magnitude affects the number of parties and legislative
fragmentation among parties. Yet parties play little to no role in structuring political competition
in some polities. How might Duverger’s rule apply in the absence of meaningful parties? Using
the case of Brazilian municipalities, this paper estimates the influence of changes in district
magnitude on alternative conceptions of political competition – the number of personalist
political coalitions and opposition strength. Results indicate that large changes in district
magnitude had a positive but minimal effect on the number of coalitions in government. The
most consequential result of a larger district magnitude was a strengthened opposition, which
increased its numbers. Evidence from fieldwork suggests that larger city councils in Brazil may
be more autonomous from the executive and engender a better check on executive power.
Chapter 2. Many factors contribute to the size and composition of public spending. Research
that examines the role of legislature size has traditionally focused on political systems where the

legislature has budgeting authority, and higher expenditures emerge as a result of logrolling.
This paper develops an alternate view of legislature size and expenditures for a political system
where an independent executive holds the budgeting authority and must spend fiscal resources to
maintain his or her legislative coalition. I examine the theory in the context of Brazilian
municipalities. Results indicate that larger legislatures led to higher public spending. An
average municipality that expanded from 10 to 15 legislators in 2013 spent 3% to 4% more than
a similarly situated municipality that maintained 10 legislators. This equals R$400k per year, or
65 minimum wage jobs, per additional legislator. There was an appreciable increase in urban
infrastructure spending, while education expenditures did not change systematically in response
to larger local councils. The overall increase and the pattern of the increase are consistent with
the notion that Brazilian mayors use public spending to build and maintain their legislative
coalitions, and that they must appropriate more public funds to achieve these goals when the
legislature is larger.
Chapter 3. The question of whether earmarked public revenues are spent on their intended
purpose has a long history in the academic literature. Theory suggests that earmarks should not
matter since budget authorities can always shuffle money between accounts. However, empirical
studies often find that much of marginal earmarked revenue is spent overwhelmingly on its
intended purpose. There are many theories for this outcome, and this paper adds one more to the
literature: transaction costs in the budgeting process. When transaction costs are low,
governments optimize between expenditure categories. When the costs are high, the earmarked
funds are spent exclusively on their intended purpose. Further development of this theory
suggests governments that are highly reliant on earmarked revenues will face unnecessary
funding shortfalls in some spending categories, and will be more likely to pay the costs of re-

allocating the revenues. The theory is tested empirically using the case of Oklahoma counties
and their management of the county highway fund from 1973 to 2012. Results are in line with
the theory, suggesting that a moderate amount of earmarked revenues stimulate specific
expenditures, but the effect diminishes as earmarks become a larger portion of the government’s
total revenues.
Chapter 4. There is increasing recognition among scholars that the fiscal link between citizens
and their governments is an important contributor to more efficient allocation of public resources
and a more accountable government. However, many local governments in developing countries
receive the majority of their funding from intergovernmental transfers, which severs that fiscal
bond. There are some cases in which local governments, despite large intergovernmental
transfers, have chosen to increase their own taxes. Understanding why local governments choose
to adopt new own-source revenues is an important step in the search for policies that encourage
more local fiscal effort. This paper examines this question in the context of a local lighting tax
in Brazilian municipalities. Results indicate that Brazilian municipal governments are willing to
engage in the politically difficult work of taxing their citizens in times of revenue shortfall and
service need, but that political calculations and the influence of nearby municipalities play a
bigger role in the decision to adopt a local tax.
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1 CHAPTER 1: DISTRICT MAGNITUDE, POLITICAL
COMPETITION AND OPPOSITION IN BRAZILIAN
MUNICIPALITIES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Scholars have consistently found that the number of legislative seats in a district plays an
important role in the nature of political competition. Districts with more seats tend to have a
higher number of parties in the legislature and more dispersion of power among political actors.
The benefit of more parties is greater access to the political process for diverse social groups,
which is often regarded as improved representation. The drawback, however, is that it is more
costly to negotiate legislation among more political groups. This can take its toll on the ability to
pass legislation and govern.
The logic presented above began with the seminal work of (Duverger, 1963), and additional
landmark contributions include (Rae, 1967; Cox, 1997), and (Powell, 2000). Recent work has
investigated the contextual factors involved in how district magnitude affects political
competition (Moser & Scheiner, 2012). This paper examines how district magnitude affects
political competition when parties have only a minimal role in structuring politics. Using the
case of Brazilian municipalities, I argue that parties are not always the appropriate basis for
political competition as conceived by Duvergerian electoral theory. Instead, loose coalitions
based on personal relationships, rather than party affiliation, is the appropriate unit of political
competition in Brazilian Municipalities. I show how changing district magnitude affects the
political balance of personalist-coalitions in the legislature.
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Cross-national studies of district magnitude and political outcomes face methodological
challenges in establishing credible causal estimates. Comparisons across countries confront
extensive heterogeneity in political systems, economic development, and social structure. It is
exceedingly difficult to control for all these differences, especially given that the number of
independent observations is limited. Cross national panel studies that compare countries across
multiple elections are unlikely to encounter the level of variation in political institutions over
time that would be necessary to use fixed effects methods. Some researchers have pursued a
clever strategy of paired matching between upper and lower house elections (Moser & Scheiner,
2012; Desposato, 2006), and others have advanced controversial instrumental variable arguments
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002). One strategy in empirical political economy has been
a turn to subnational studies, especially in federal systems (e.g. Putnam, 1994). This option
offers greater institutional homogeneity and potentially more observations. Additionally, there
are often institutional rules that facilitate empirical strategies to correct for policy endogeneity.
This paper leverages the institutional homogeneity and exogenous policy change in Brazilian
municipalities to produces credible estimates regarding the impact of district magnitude on
political competition.
I find that recent changes in district magnitude have important implications for the political
structure of Brazilian legislatures. Among the most important of these is that the increased
district magnitude brought many more participants into the political process. Political
fragmentation as traditionally measured with respect to parties increased, but it was less
pronounced with respect to electoral coalitions. The influence of the opposition, however,
increased. While the percentage of the opposition in legislatures was not greatly affected, the

2

number of opposition legislators rose and this alone may have important implications for the
independence of the legislature from the executive.
This paper begins by considering how the concept of political competition is used in electoral
theory and what alternative measures might look like in the absence of a strong party system.
The second section introduces the Brazilian district-magnitude policy that this paper uses as its
source of exogenous variation. The paper then gives an overview of the mixed-methods
approach that was used to generate and test theory. In the remaining sections, empirical results
are presented for two separate outcome classes: How the policy of larger district magnitude
affected political fragmentation and how it affected opposition strength.

1.2 POLITICAL COMPETITION
Competition for political power serves two purposes in a democracy. It provides choice in an
election so that an unsatisfied citizenry may replace its leader (Schumpeter, 2008). Competition
also serves an informational function so that society may be better informed (Mill, 1956), and
elected officials may understand the mandates with which they are charged by the voters
(Rousseau, 1968). Even in the liberal view of democracy, where modern social choice theory
sees mandates as incoherent, democratic competition plays an important informational role.
Adopting a liberal conception of democracy, I discuss the role of competition in the context of
modern electoral theory, and I explain why the use of alternative concepts of competition might
sometimes be appropriate.
1.2.1 Electoral Competition
Competition provides voters with choice in an election. The contours of this choice vary
depending on which political divisions are salient within a society. If the political divisions are
3

an expression of social cleavages like class, religion, region or the urban/rural divide, then
candidates should emerge to offer solutions tailored to the preferences of these groups. To the
extent that these divisions are persistent over time, group leaders may invest in building
organizations to promote the groups’ political interests. These are political parties which are
rooted in society. Alternatively, political elites may develop parties purely for electoral purposes
that find it convenient to foment social division in pursuit of voter support. Regardless of how
the parties came to be, they often reflect competing sets of social preferences, and political
competition is structured based on parties.
Electoral systems theory studies how electoral institutions influence who wins office. To make
empirical progress on this question, the notion of who is elected must be abstracted from the
individual to a group level. A natural system of grouping is based on political parties, which
ostensibly represent discrete sets of social preferences. Electoral systems scholars can then make
statements about how electoral rules shape the aggregation and final distribution of the
preferences, defined as a party, that win legislative seats1.
In many countries, this is a sensible approach because parties are the natural unit of political
competition. In the extreme case of closed list proportional representation (PR) electoral
systems, voters select parties to represent them, not individuals. But even in less restrictive
systems, the party is an important organizing force. Parties solicit and redirect campaign
financing to their members, and they use this money to maintain the loyalties of individual
legislators to the overall party goals. From the voter’s point of view, a party affiliation may
reduce the costs of screening candidates (Aldrich, 1995). Where voters trust that parties will

1

Landmark contributions include (Duverger, 1963), (Rae, 1967), (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989), (Cox, 1997),
(Powell, 2000), and (Moser & Scheiner, 2012).
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screen and discipline their candidates, voters will align themselves with the party that most
closely matches their preference. Competition then becomes a game in which parties seek to
convince marginal voting blocks to defect from their old party allegiance and to vote with their
party.
Empirical research on electoral systems theory has been productive where parties are the
appropriate unit of political competition. The number of parties can be used as a key outcome
variable to understand the extent to which electoral institutions aggregate preferences (Powell,
2000). Proportional Representation (PR) systems provide a relatively low level of preference
aggregation; many parties exist and are elected to the legislature. PR legislatures are highly
representative of social preferences and the body is divided among a large number of preference
groups (parties). This division is known as fractionalization (Rae, 1967; Lijphart, 1994), and
bargaining costs to reach final legislation are high relative to less fragmented legislatures.
Majoritarian electoral systems, on the other hand, provide a high level of preference aggregation,
where only a few parties are elected to the legislature. In single-member-district systems, often
only two parties exist (Duverger, 1963). As such, they have low level of preference
fractionalization (low representation), and the costs of bargaining to arrive at final legislation are
lower than that of PR systems (Powell, 2000).
Parties are not always the most informative measurement of political competition. Scholars
have identified weak parties and weak party systems as an important feature of Latin American
politics (Mainwaring, 1999; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999). In these political systems, analysis of
the electoral systems using number of parties as an outcome variable tells us less about the extent
to which the political process is open to political groups. The relevant political organizing
principle in these countries is that of clientelistic networks of personal relations. Electoral
5

coalitions are formed based on personal relationships and electoral math. Politicians, who join
forces with other politicians to compete in an election, win office and allocate state resources,
such as public sector jobs and contracts, among their winning coalition. Political competition is
fierce, but party affiliation plays only a minor role in coalition and voter decisions. In this
context, to say that larger district magnitude leads to more parties in government says nothing
about how electoral rules affect the preferences represented in government. A more appropriate
means to analyze the electoral system in terms of the extent to which electoral rules open the
legislature to political groups, one should replace the number of parties with the number of
coalitions as an outcome variable.
1.2.2 Competition outside of Elections
A common concern in the democratic accountability literature is that, “Where the election ends,
tyranny begins (Madison, 1787, #53).” The fact that most modern democracies do not devolve
into tyranny in non-election years has prompted contemporary scholars to search for the sources
of democratic accountability. Madison’s answer was that competent men of public spirit should
be continually approved in frequent elections (Madison, 1787, #53). Contemporary literature
echoes this argument using the language of principle-agent theory. Good agents are selected in
the election process (prospective voting), and then their record is reviewed and approved or
rejected in subsequent elections (retrospective voting) (Przeworski & Stokes, 1999). The same
view is apparently held by many legislators in Brazil, where one explained, “The first election is
about what you say you’re going to do. The rest are about what you have done.” In reality, it is
never this clear. Journalists write extensively about the past semi-public work of first-time
candidates, and many incumbents with poor records have won elections based on their next-term
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agenda2. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently clear that if voters are to judge the fitness of their
government for reelection, they need information on its performance. Voters gather much of this
information from their experiences. Economic performance and public service quality are
outcome variables that affect a voter’s evaluation of his or her government. However, the voting
decision will also benefit from information about the government’s activities and effort, not just
outcomes. Some outcomes are simply not observable to the general public. For example, is the
government conducting its public bidding in a proper manner? Is the government investing
sufficient resources in water transportation and storage? Is the government following budgeting
procedures? Is it hiring based on competency or kin relations?
Political competition is useful not only for providing choice during an election, but also in
helping the public monitor and control their representatives outside of election periods. Interbranch competition (checks and balances) provides monitoring and enforcement. For example,
the legislature supplies oversight to the executive branch, and can also take concrete steps to
sanction other branches that encroach upon it. Intra-legislative competition, on the other hand,
may bring about both monitoring and enforcement, but enforcement against the executive branch
will be scarce if the executive controls a majority of the legislature. When the size of the
legislative opposition falls below a set voting threshold, the opposition is powerless to take
concrete actions against the majority. Its best alternative, in this case, is to use its intimate
knowledge of the legislative process and government activities to embarrass the government in a
public forum. For example, the key voting threshold in Brazilian Municipalities is 1/3. Without
possession of 1/3 of the legislative seats, the Majority in the legislature can pass any legislation it

2

The recent victory of Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff is an example of this. She was the incumbent with a
history of poor economic management. In a change election, she ran on the platform of “more change,” and won the
election based on her agenda, not her track record.
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likes. The opposition has no effective power. As one majority councilor put it, “Without 1/3
they can’t affect the functioning of the council. All they can do is complain.”
Yet public complaints and theater from the opposition can play an important role in holding the
government accountable. When the opposition’s representation is below the critical voting level,
adding even just a few more opposition legislators can change the debate through agitation,
delays, and public pressure.
1.2.3 Majority and Opposition Coalitions in Brazilian Municipalities
The district magnitude can affect the strength of the opposition, which is the set of political
groups that are outside of the government, looking in. If multiple political groups are in the
opposition, they will often unify to criticize the government in an attempt to eventually win back
power. Opposition promotes accountability. At times the opposition’s criticisms will be
contrived and bombastic, but sometimes they will carry merit. Through public discourse, the
ambitious opposition raises questions to which the majority must respond if it is to maintain
power in subsequent elections. This is the manner in which competition generates information
that is relevant to voter choice. One Brazilian opposition councilor described his experience as
follows:
The mayor could run us over with a tractor. Anything he needs is going to pass, and pass quickly.
His son is the President of the Legislature. A cynic would say that we’re basically an extension of
the mayor’s office.
When there were 10 councilors, the mayor had 8 in his coalition. Now there are 15 councilors
and he has 11 or 12. Before, he won with no problem. Now, he wins at war. Nobody likes to win
at war, so he has been more hands off.
Because we don’t have a majority, we only have two ways to put the mayor on the defensive (1)
Invite lots of people to the sessions, so then the majority has less courage to pass the mayor’s
agenda. (2) We don’t have access to the press, because they have contracts with the legislature
and mayor’s office. Social media is what saves us. Me and [another opposition councilor] have
the most weight on Facebook. That’s where we denounce the government.
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It is clear that just adding one or two opposition councilors, even while remaining below the 1/3
vote threshold, can pose challenges to the mayor’s legislative agenda. In some cases, it might
require more persuasion or fiscal resources to pass an important project. A city councilor
observed,
The mayor needs to work harder to convince more people that something is a good project. In the
past, he just had to convince 7 city councilors, but now he needs to convince 9 councilors.

An increase in opposition legislators also brings the chance that some of them might be fanatical,
as in the case of this legislator who believes his sole purpose as a legislator is to investigate the
mayor’s office:
I am religious and I know I was put here for a reason. I need to investigate and call out
corruption in government.
I have been denouncing several things since 2000. In 2008 I made a denunciation and I was sued
for R$ 500,000. I had R$ 3 million in court cases against me and my newspaper when I decided
the only way to change this was to enter politics. I decided to become a candidate in May of 2012.
I didn’t do any campaign strategy or planning. I created a 4 page brochure on what I was going
to investigate, and I distributed 10,000 of them. That was my entire campaign.
I ended last year with 500 official data requests to the mayor. This year, I have 400. I use my time
to investigate and get answers. I’m known as the councilor who investigates. Most of the tips
come to me through my blog or Facebook, but some people even send me denunciations on
WhatsApp.
I walk with security yes, because I get threats for the stuff that I do. For a while I had two
bodyguards, and now I have just one.

As important as opposition legislators might be for accountability, they are relatively uncommon.
Without the mayor’s help, it can be an uphill battle for an opposition councilor to win reelection.
The mayor is uncooperative with data requests from opposition legislators, and he may even be
slow to respond to service requests from the opposition legislator’s constituents. During the
campaign, opponents paint the opposition legislator as somebody who cannot provide for the
community:
It’s good to be seen as a sponsor of a public works project. If you’re in the opposition, that
project is still going to happen. But the Mayor won’t invite you to the inauguration and he’s
going to praise another councilor at the ceremony.
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Equally bad, an opposition legislator will not have access to public sector jobs for his political
supporters:
I was the mayor’s guy in the legislature, but then I started to grow politically. The mayor felt
threatened and so he retaliated. I had the right to 8 appointed jobs in the mayor’s office, and then
he took those jobs away from me.

The payoff for majority members remaining loyal to the mayor is handsome. Majority
legislators have access to the mayor and the public resources that he or she controls. These
resources are an important leg-up when elections arrive. However, the majority trades the ability
to criticize the administration, and they are expected to defend it against the opposition and
against angry citizens. It can be painful for majority legislators to sit in session after session,
bearing the brunt of the opposition’s criticisms, especially when they are warranted. When the
opposition consists of only one or two dissidents, it is easy to give them their turn to speak, and
then move on with business. But when the opposition is three or four people, the psychological
stress of the criticism mounts. Three or four opposition councilors can tie up debate and
summon a vocal gallery and street protestors in a way that one or two councilors cannot. The
practical effect of the ability to generate a protest of critical mass means the mayor cannot rely
on the legislative majority to vote with him every time the opposition is against his agenda. The
uncertainty associated with a stronger opposition means the mayor must be more discriminating
in which legislative initiatives he promotes. As a result, the legislature increases its
independence from the executive.
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1.3 POLICY BACKGROUND
1.3.1 Government and Elections in Brazilian Municipalities
Brazil has been independent for almost 200 years, but the current State, the 5th Republic, is only
a quarter of a century old. The Constitution was passed in 1988, and it determines the
institutional order in all of Brazil. Article 18 of the constitution establishes a federal structure
where municipalities are considered to be autonomous federal units:
Art. 18: The political-administrative organization of the Federal Republic of Brazil is composed
of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities 3, all autonomous, in terms of
this constitution.

Article 30 lists the responsibilities of the municipalities to deliver local services and legislate on
matters of local interest. The largest expenditures of the municipalities in 2013 were Education,
Health, Administration, and Infrastructure. Article 29 outlines the essential characteristics of the
municipality, including the size of the legislature:
Art. 29: The Municipality will rule itself through an Organic Law…ratified by twothirds of the municipal legislature in two separate votes, attending to the following
principles:
I – Election of a Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and City Councilors, for terms of four years,
through a direct election simultaneously realized across the entire country.
II – Election of the Mayor and Vice-Mayor up until 90 days before the end of the term
of those whom they will succeed, following Article 77 [runoff required], if there are
more than 200 thousand voters.
III – Inauguration of the Mayor and Vice-Mayor on the 1st of January in the year
following the election.
IV – Number of City Councilors proportional to the population of the Municipality,
observing the following limits
a) A minimum of 9 and maximum of 21 in Municipalities with up to one million
inhabitants
b) A minimum of 30 and maximum of 41 in Municipalities with more than one
million and less than five million inhabitants
c) A minimum of 42 and a maximum of 55 in Municipalities with more than five
million inhabitants.
3

Brazil has roughly 5,500 municipalities, each with a geographical extent comparable to that of U.S. Counties.
Brazilian municipalities are typically composed of multiple urban centers surrounded by rural areas.
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V – Remuneration of the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and City Councilors fixed by the
Municipal Legislature for the following legislature, observing the terms of [other
constitutional articles].
In summary, the 1988 constitution defines municipalities as autonomous entities with significant
responsibilities. Their institutional structures are highly standardized with a Mayor and ViceMayor who run on the same ticket, and a municipal legislature. They are all subject to the same
electoral rules under the control of the Electoral Court System, whose highest body is the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). The fact that the electoral rules are outside the purview of
local officials and applied in a rational manner offers a promising environment in which to study
their effects.
1.3.2 Federal Guidelines for Size of Municipal Legislature
The number of municipal council seats has varied significantly over time from 2000 to 2012,
with large change episodes occurring in 2004 and in 2012. Figure 1-1 shows this pattern in
Brazil’s 5,500 municipalities, as well as how the number of seats in each municipality are related
to population. The large changes are evident with municipalities losing seats between 2000 and
2004, maintaining the same number of seats from 2004 to 2008, and then a large increase in seats
in 2012. These large fluctuations were the results of deliberate policy changes over the past 15
years.
Article 29 of the 1988 Constitution sets a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 21 city councilors
for municipalities under 1 million inhabitants. It also, in a clause that would later generate much
confusion and litigation, required that the number of councilors be in proportion to the
population of the municipality. The controversy emerged around whether the proportionality
implied an arithmetic rule.
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Throughout the 1990s and until 2002, “it was the TSE’s understanding that that Constitution did
not establish arithmetic criteria for the calculation of the proportionality, leaving the
Municipality with the autonomy to set it, as long as it complied with the limits in Article 29, part
IV.4” This approach resulted in a situation where the number of council seats bore little
relationship to population. Some municipalities had too few seats given their population (e.g.
Sumaré with 13 seats for 168,000 people), and some municipalities had too many seats (e.g. São
Manuel with 21 seats for 38,000 people). This all changed in May 2004 with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in the Mira Estrela case.
Mira Estrela is a tiny municipality of three thousand inhabitants in the northwest of São Paulo
state. It had established the size of its city council at 11 seats through an Organic Law, using the
procedure laid out by the constitution. The choice of 11 seats was not well received by São
Paulo’s Public Ministry5, who interpreted the law as unconstitutional. It argued that such a small
municipality should have nine seats to meet the “proportionality” standard in Art 29, Part IV of
the constitution. It sued Mira Estrela, and the case eventually ended up in the Supreme Court
(STF). The lead Justice assigned to the Mira Estrela case was Maurício Corrêa. Justice Corrêa
and the majority of his colleagues ruled that the concept of proportionality was “empty” without
an established arithmetic rule, and they directed the TSE to implement one for the September
2004 municipal elections. In their decision, they defined a rule using the following reasoning:
From the fact that municipalities with one million have 21 representatives, this implies one
representative per 47,619 inhabitants. But since the 1988 constitution requires at least 9

4

Page 378 of Recurso Extraordinário 197.917-8 São Paulo, Voto do Relator Ministro Maurício Corrêa

5

The Public Ministry has no equivalent in the United States. It is a Prosecutorial office with broad powers to bring
civil cases against governments, corporations, and individuals as it sees fit with the end goal of defending the
constitution.
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representatives per municipality, apply this number to any municipalities with fewer than 47,619
inhabitants, and add one more representative for each increment of 47,619 people. This formula
generates a piecewise representation profile that rises quickly to the maximum of 21, and then
flattens out at 47,619 + (11*47,619) = 571,428 inhabitants until 1 million inhabitants.
Municipalities above one million, of which there are fewer than ten, receive a slightly different
treatment. After 16 years of confusion, the Mira Estrela case finally established clear guidance
on the number of seats in the municipal legislature.
The practical result of the Mira Estrela case was a sizeable reduction in the number of city
council seats from around 60,000 to 50,000 in the entire country. Perhaps predictably, it also
engendered angry responses from the political establishment. Many politicians felt that their
legislative powers had been usurped by an activist Supreme Court, and an amendment was
immediately introduced to reestablish the number of municipal legislature seats. The
amendment took several years to work its way through the process and was finally ratified as the
58th Amendment on Wednesday, September 23 of 2009. While the impetus for the amendment
was the Mira Estrela case and the issue of representation, Congress recognized that the public
would not accept an increase in municipal legislature size without some kind of budgetary
control. Accordingly, the 58th Amendment contained articles that modified the number of
municipal representatives in Art. 29 IV, as well as tightened the budgetary caps that had
previously been specified in the Constitution (Art. 29-A.)
The first article of the 58th amendment dramatically increased the maximum permissible number
of representatives above what had been the Mira Estrela rule. It specified the maximum number
of representatives for 23 separate population segments, clarifying the relation between
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population and representation. The language for municipalities with up to 1,050,000 inhabitants
was as follows:
Art. 29, IV: For the Composition of Municipal Legislatures, the following limits will be observed:
a) 9 councilors, in municipalities up until 15,000 inhabitants;
b) 11 councilors, in municipalities of more than 15,000 and up until 30,000 inhabitants;
c) 13 councilors, in municipalities of more than 30,000 and up until 50,000 inhabitants;
d) 15 councilors, in municipalities of more than 50,000 and up until 80,000 inhabitants;
e) 17 councilors, in municipalities of more than 80,000 and up until 120,000 inhabitants;
f) 19 councilors, in municipalities of more than 120,000 and up until 160,000 inhabitants;
g) 21 councilors, in municipalities of more than 160,000 and up until 300,000 inhabitants;
h) 23 councilors, in municipalities of more than 300,000 and up until 450,000 inhabitants;
i) 25 councilors, in municipalities of more than 450,000 and up until 600,000 inhabitants;
j) 27 councilors, in municipalities of more than 600,000 and up until 750,000 inhabitants;
k) 29 councilors, in municipalities of more than 750,000 and up until 900,000 inhabitants;
l) 31 councilors, in municipalities of more than 900,000 and up until 1,500,000 inhabitants;

Article 1 of the 58th Amendment, which permitted large changes in the size of the municipal
legislature, entered into force with the 2012 municipal elections. The change in legislature size
was substantial for some municipalities. For example, the municipality of Salto with 107
thousand residents expanded its legislature from 11 councilors to 17 councilors in 2012. This
represents a greater than 50% increase in legislature size.

1.4 METHODS OVERVIEW
This paper uses an iterative mixed-methods approach (Lieberman, 2005) to understand the
political effects of a change in district magnitude. I conducted an initial large-N analysis to
uncover potential avenues of study and to inform case selection. I selected municipalities and
city councilors, their staff, and journalists to interview about their experiences with the decision
to expand the legislature and with the seat increase. I used semi-structured interviews to develop
contextual knowledge and produce testable hypotheses about the impact the policy had on
political competition. Excerpts from these interviews are interspersed throughout this paper

15

because they present a rich illustration of politics in Brazilian municipalities and because they
are direct descriptions from people who experienced an increase in district magnitude first-hand.
The case selection proceeded primarily from the relationship between change in council size and
change in the number of candidates running for office in São Paulo. Figure 1-2 shows how
municipalities in the state of São Paulo experienced an increase in the number of candidates as
they expanded their councils between the 2008 and 2012 elections. The increase in candidates
presents little surprise, since the electoral rules reward electoral coalitions that grow their
candidate lists in proportion to the number of seats. However, there is a large degree of variation
in how the seat expansions affected the number of candidates. Some municipalities added only a
few candidates per seat, and some added as many as 50 new candidates per seat. To discover
what additional factors affect the number of candidates (and election dynamics in general), the
case selection sought to choose municipalities that fit into one of four categories depending on
whether the increase in candidates was expected given the change in number of seats and
depending on the extent to which the municipality increased its legislature size. Table 1.1 shows
how the selected municipalities fit into the given selection criteria. The goal in examining cities
where candidate increases were expected is to see the causal mechanism in action under
“normal” circumstances. Franco da Rocha and Salto experienced roughly average outcomes.
Franco da Rocha added no seats and saw little change in the number of candidates from 2008.
Salto added six seats and 150 new candidates, which is just above what would have been
expected given a six seat increase. The “off the line” cases of Itu, Arujá, and Barueri are
intended as challenges to the notion that larger district magnitude brings about more candidates.
In each of these cases, I paid close attention to competing factors that affected the number of
candidates in the race. I found that their “anomalous” behavior was due to mayoral political
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competition. Council candidate totals were reduced where the mayoral race was a lock for an
incumbent mayor, and they increased where the mayoral race was particularly tight. The nature
of the race (i.e. incumbent or open) is clearly an important factor in candidate participation,
which suggests it should also be included in any model that examines related outcomes such as
number of parties or number of coalitions. Figure 1-3 shows the historical levels for number of
seats and number of candidates for the past 3 elections. One can verify, even from this small
number of cases that there appears to be a relationship between number of seats (solid line) and
the number of candidates, though at least one municipality (Arujá) bucks the trend and one
municipality, Barueri, seems over-sensitive to the seat change. Again, the missing factor that
explains these trends were that Arujá had a particularly non-competitive mayoral election that
year, while two well-known politicians ran for mayor in a hypercompetitive Barueri election.
Case selection also necessarily faced a practical constraint, which was that the municipalities
were within reasonable travel distance of São Paulo. As such, the selected cases are all located
within two hours of the city of São Paulo. I conducted approximately 25 interviews with city
councilors, staff members, and journalists across the five municipalities during the fall of 2014.

1.5 POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION
The electoral systems literature has traditionally focused on the number of parties as an
important outcome of the electoral institutions. This section shows how coalitions, not parties,
are the appropriate grouping for political competition in the context of Brazilian municipalities.
It also estimates the impact that a change in district magnitude has on the number of parties and
on the number of mayoral coalitions.
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1.5.1 Political Parties and Coalitions in Brazilian Municipalities
The literature in Political Science has traditionally seen Brazil as having an especially weak party
system (Mainwaring, 1999). Over the past decade, scholarship on Brazilian Parties has noted
substantial change. At the national level, party voting discipline has steadily improved and party
switching is less endemic. Part of this strengthening at the national level is that parties have
learned how to leverage the distribution of important electoral resources such as public campaign
funds and advertising time to support candidates for national and state government.
Furthermore, independent candidates are not allowed. A candidate must be a member of a party
to run for any public office. The seat now technically belongs to the party (Brazilian
Government, 1995), and parties are no longer required to automatically re-nominate their
incumbent legislators. Consequently, Brazilian parties have increasing control over who they
present as candidates.
The advances in strengthening the Brazilian Party System at the Federal and State levels have
been less pronounced in municipal politics. The same rules apply at the Federal and Municipal
levels in that every candidate must be a member of a party and parties are the basic unit of
competition defined in electoral law. In practice, however, local politicians say that mayoral
coalitions, rather than parties, compete. In the words of one city councilor,
The parties don’t have independence. The Mayor has control over all the parties. Our Mayor has
12 parties under his control. If he wants to pull people out of the [legislative] opposition and
increase his majority, he does the following: He finds a councilor candidate that had good voting,
but lost the last election. He creates a new party for that councilor and puts 10 more people in
that party to get votes and make it strong in the next election…He installs a party that doesn’t
have a presence in town and he tells the state party, I’ll pay (e.g. $10,000 per month) to operate
the party here.

The municipality of Barueri increased the number of seats by seven in 2012, and the number of
candidates jumped by four hundred. The reasons for this show just how parties mean little
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beyond a formal rule with which politicians must comply. The precipitous increase in candidates
happened in Barueri because,
We used to have just one political group. Then there was a divergence between two of the main
leaders. Gil Arantes put together a mega-group to run with him, and so Furlans had to do the
same thing. They started to say, “I need you in the dispute.” This had very little to do with
candidates just deciding to run on their own. We ended up with more parties because we needed
more boxes to hold all the new candidates.”

The mayoral candidates provide the bulk of the campaign financing to their coalition’s council
candidates. One councilor pointed out that companies do not give money to councilors.
Businesses donate to the campaign funds of the mayors, and then the mayors use that money to
finance their “team” in the legislature. Powerful rivals also mount mayoral campaigns with their
own group of legislative candidates. Political endorsements are traded within these coalitions.
Figure 1-4 illustrates that it is uncommon for a party to remain outside of a mayoral coalition. In
over 3,000 of 5,500 municipalities in 2012, 100% of the parties joined a coalition. In 4,000
municipalities, over 90% of the parties were in a coalition. In short, joining an electoral coalition
is standard procedure for most local Brazilian parties.
The party label is just as meaningless for new candidates, some of whom put surprisingly little
thought into which parties to join. They understand that they must be in a party to run, but base
their choices more on personal connections than ideological affinities. I witnessed an exchange
between the secretary of a party president and a prospective candidate who had arrived at the
office to join a party:
Man: I want to join the party.
Party Secretary: Ok, but we can’t start taking registration until next year. I’ll call you in January
if you leave your number.
Man leaves his phone number, and begins to leave the office.
Party Secretary: Oh, by the way, the party is PROS.
Man: Sure, whatever.
Me: Why did you come here to register instead of another office?
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Man: I’ve seen this councilor around town and I like him.

I asked other councilors why they joined their parties, and they often said it was through their
network of friends. Aside from PT councilors, most councilors regarded their parties as nothing
more than a platform from which they ran for office.
The claim that coalitions are the primary unit of political competition at the local level is not to
deny that some local parties are reasonably independent. Programmatic parties like the PT and
PSOL are more responsive to party leadership, but even they face the cold, hard electoral math of
electoral coalitions.
I’m the President of the PT in this town…If the PT’s vote count falls in the next election, then we
would be concerned about colligating with Sebastian [President of the PSCD party].
Ideologically, he is the party of the opposition. But also – mathematically – he has 1700 votes.
One wants to take advantage of the other, but since you don’t know exactly what is going to
happen, you run the risk.
We support the end of the electoral coalition, but meanwhile we are a political party. PSOL won’t
colligate for ideological reasons and they don’t get elected. What is the point of that? The
coalition distorts because you need to cooperate to get in, to not be out of the game, but two
parties on opposite side gay marriage can be selected together.

1.5.2 District Magnitude, Parties, and Coalitions in Brazilian Municipalities
The number of seats in a district, the district magnitude, is an important institutional driver of the
extent to which political rivals coordinate before or after an election. The preceding discussion
makes clear that electoral rivalry occurs at the level of coalitions and not parties.
We should expect an increase in the district magnitude to increase the number of candidates and
the number of parties in a municipality. The number of candidates that a party or coalition is
permitted to field is a proportional function of the number of seats, and parties benefit by having
their lists as full as possible. It is true that there is a minor tradeoff between the quality and
quantity of council candidates, since low quality candidates might not be worth the coalition’s
campaign funding. These considerations, however, seemed to take a backseat to the evaluation
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among councilors that more candidates contributing their votes to the coalition was a preferable
strategy. The immediate barrier to increasing the number of coalition candidates was the number
of parties available to house these candidates. Mayors often created new parties to install the
additional candidates, which is why we should expect to see that the number of parties increase
as do the number of council seats.
Brazil’s electoral coalitions must formally register with the electoral authority, so it is possible to
objectively define a coalition. Using the coalitions as the unit of political competition6, we
should expect to see an increase in their numbers as the council size expands. A change in the
number of coalitions reflects changes in pre-electoral coordination. If more political actors
believe they have a chance to win office due to changes in electoral rules, then they will be less
likely to join a big coalition. They might even go it alone, which would increase the number of
coalitions. A change in the number of coalitions that win seats, beyond the increase in all
coalitions, reflects factors such as the electoral formula (mechanical effect) and voter
coordination (voter psychological effect). Research has found that voters have a difficult time
voting strategically in districts with magnitudes greater than five seats (Cox, 1997). It is unlikely
that voters are able to coordinate in these races, so the electoral effect is likely to be a pure
mechanical effect of the electoral formula allowing more coalitions into office.
An increase in mayoral coalitions necessarily means an increase in the number of mayoral
candidates. One might wonder what effect the change in seats has on the competitiveness of the
mayoral race. Might more seats and more coalitions reduce the average vote share that wins

6

If a political party does not join a coalition, it counts as a coalition for measurement purposes.
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mayoral races? Might more candidates impede the ability of voters to coordinate their votes in a
majoritarian election (Cox, 1997)? I test these considerations.
1.5.3 Model & Data
I estimate the effect of an increase in seats for several outcome variables, including for the
number of parties, the number of parties winning a council seat, the number of coalitions, the
number of coalitions winning a council seat, the number of candidates, the winning voteshare for
the mayoral race, and the FS difference.
The FS difference is a modification of Cox’s “FS ratio.” It measures the difference in voteshare
between the first and second loser of a majoritarian election, like the municipal mayoral race.
An increasing FS difference is evidence that voters are strategically concentrating their votes in
the top two candidates.
Brazilian mayors may be elected to two consecutive terms, and incumbency is a powerful
advantage in the elections. Municipalities in which the mayor has experienced a good first term
and is cruising to re-election will not engender as much competition. One would expect fewer
parties and fewer candidates to join the race. The incumbency status may also be correlated with
the probability that a municipality increase its council size. For example, incumbent mayors
might be less likely to support council size increases since they know larger councils will make
their work more difficult in their second term. Thus, an indicator is included to identify whether
the election is one in which an incumbent is running.
All outcome variables are modeled identically, relying on the difference between the 2008 and
2012 elections for identification. The OLS model is:
Outcomeit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Seatsit + 𝛽3 Incumbent it + 𝛽4 LogPopit + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it
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(1)

The parameter of interest is 𝛽1, which estimates the effect of an increase in seats on the outcome
variables. While incumbency is included in the model primarily as a control, 𝛽3 is also
intrinsically interesting. It shows the effect that an incumbent election has on the level of
political competition, as measured by the outcome variables. The log of population is included as
a control variable. Municipal fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖 , are included to factor out slow moving factors
like political culture, economic development, or regional tendencies. A time fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡 ,
controls for general trends between the 2008 and 2012 elections. 𝜖it is the unexplained
component of the model. In addition to an OLS estimation, the models are estimated using 2SLS
to judge the robustness of the results. The instrument for seats is the ceiling proscribed by
federal legislation discussed above.
^

Outcomeit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 Seatsit + 𝛼3 Incumbent it + 𝛼3 LogPopit + 𝜓𝑖 + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜈it

(2-A)

The first stage is modeled using the seats instrumental variable and the other exogenous
covariates that appear in equation 2-A.
Seatsit = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 SeatsIVit + 𝜋3 Incumbent it + 𝜋3 LogPopit + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜂it

(2-B)

I obtained the data from Brazil’s Electoral Authority (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) do
Brasil, 2015). It was necessary to calculate the dependent variables and the indicator for an
incumbent election, since this information is not provided directly by the TSE.
1.5.4 Descriptive Statistics for Fragmentation Variables
There are approximately 5,500 municipalities covered here. Municipalities of greater than one
million inhabitants are excluded because there are relatively few of them and the rules that
determine their city council size are different than those under 1 million. Brazil has many small
municipalities, which is apparent in the size of the electorate and the population in Table 1.2.
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The average population for municipalities under 1 million residents is about 27,000 residents in
both years, and 15,000 of them voted for a mayoral candidate. The average number of city
council seats in 2008 was 9.27, and it increased to 10.25 in 2012. On average this is a one seat
increase per municipality, which is just over a 10% increase. In practice, some municipalities
increased their councils by a large amount (e.g. 40% or 50%), and others chose not to expand
their councils at all. The variation in this independent variable is visible in Figure 1-1.
Table 1.2 is useful to obtain a baseline understanding of the outcome variables. For example, the
average municipality has approximately 10-12 political parties, and about half of those parties
are elected to the city council. There are fewer coalitions, as would be expected. The average
municipality has just over 3 coalitions, which means they have approximately 3 mayoral
candidates in a municipal election. On average, 2.5 of those coalitions win seats in the
legislature. A high proportion of the elections are ones in which the incumbent mayor is
running. In 2008, 57% of the elections were incumbent races, while that number was 44% in
2012. The incumbent certainly is advantaged, but he or she does lose. In 2012, the incumbent
won 38% of the elections, and in 2012 the incumbent won 24% of the elections compared to the
44% of the elections in which the incumbent ran.
The average winning vote share for mayor was around 56% - 57%, with a standard deviation of
around 13 percentage points. This highlights the fact that many mayors win office with less than
(and sometimes significantly less than) the majority of the votes. In other municipalities,
mayoral candidates win with 80% - 100% of the vote. The average difference in vote shares
between the first losing mayor (second place) and the second losing mayor (third place), is
substantial. The FS Share difference is around 24 percentage points, which means that on
average, the third placed mayoral candidate does not come close to being competitive.
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The number of council candidates running in the 2012 election increased dramatically. In 2008,
the average municipality (with 27,000 people) had 56 city council candidates. By 2012, there
were 73 candidates for councilor, a 30% increase. On a per seat basis, however, the number of
candidates rose only moderately, from 5.8 candidates per seat in 2008 to 6.6 candidates per seat
in 2012.
1.5.5 Multivariate Results for Fragmentation Outcomes
Four model specifications are estimated for the outcome variables. The baseline estimate is OLS
without the regression controls of population or incumbent election in equation (1). The second
specification is the OLS estimate with the population and incumbent election controls in
equation (1). The third estimate is the 2SLS from equations (2) without the controls, and the
fourth estimate is the 2SLS from equations (2) with the population and incumbent controls.
Table 1.3 arranges these estimates into columns. Cells contain the estimates of the effect of a
change in one seat on each of the outcome variables.
A series of rows at the bottom of Table 1.3 show how the model specifications are different.
Estimates (1) and (3) do not use controls beyond municipal and year fixed effects. Estimates (3)
and (4) replace the number of seats with a predicted number of seats given the federal ceiling.
The estimates are relatively stable across several specifications that are quite different.
Furthermore, the model has enough precision to say that the estimates of seats on party and
coalition formation are statistically different from zero.
The model estimates an increase in the number of parties by 0.25 for each additional seat.
Municipalities that added four seats could therefore expect one additional party to be created.
The model estimates an increase in the number of parties that win a seat by approximately 0.4
per additional seat. Thus, municipalities that expanded their legislature size by two or three seats
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could expect another party to be elected. Of course, the discussion above suggests that these
parties are not meaningful in the sense that they don’t introduce new representation into the
legislature.
The effect of the seat increases on the number of coalitions in a municipality is positive but
minimal. The estimates suggest that 0.10 coalitions are formed as a result of an additional seat.
Thus, a municipality would have to add ten seats in order to expect an additional coalition to be
formed in the municipality. The number of seats necessary to elect a new coalition to the
legislature is only marginally different. Given that the estimate is 0.15 new coalitions in the
legislature per seat, a municipality would have to increase its legislature by six or seven seats in
order to bring a new mayoral coalition into the legislature. While these estimates are not
practically large, they are interesting in that they show that there is less pre-electoral
coordination among coalitions when there are more legislative seats available.
The estimates suggest that the increase in the number of seats did not significantly influence the
voteshare with which the mayor won the election. The signs of the estimates are generally
negative, but they are also very close to zero, practically speaking. The three negative estimates
are generally around one tenth of one percentage point per seat. Assuming these estimates are
correct, even the addition of five seats would only reduce the winning voteshare by 0.5
percentage points.
Overall, the estimates show that the increase in the number of seats had the effect in the
generally expected direction, but that these effects are not particularly large. This is somewhat
expected, given that the district magnitude was already quite high (10 – 15) for these
municipalities. However, if we consider opposition rather than fragmentation as an outcome
variable, the results show that this reform could potentially have a large impact.
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1.6 OPPOSITION
Brazil’s system of government is often referred to as Parliamentary Presidentialism. This applies
at all levels of government, from the federal government, to the states, and in the municipalities.
While the executive is elected independently of the legislature, he or she has the responsibility of
constructing a legislative coalition to pursue an agenda. Academics originally expected this
arrangement to create political deadlock (Ames, 2001), but Brazilian executives have been
generally successful in passing their policy agendas (Melo & Pereira, 2013). The executive is
able to offer public sector jobs, pork-barrel spending, and even campaign funds to prospective
members of the majority in exchange for their legislative support. The unequal relationship
between the executive and the legislature in municipalities means that democratic accountability
has taken on a distinct parliamentary style. The shift to larger legislatures in the municipalities
has the potential to change the accountability style from one of parliamentarism to something
closer resembling presidentialism.
Parliamentary accountability is characterized by a narrower chain of delegation from the voter to
the government’s activities (Strøm, 2000). The voters hold the ruling party or coalition
responsible because they know that the opposition has limited opportunity to interfere or obstruct
the ruler’s policies. Presidential-style accountability, on the other hand, builds additional
conflict into the institutional arrangement in order to increase competition and offer meaningful
opportunities for the opposition to have their concerns heard and addressed.
Strøm points out that parliamentary accountability relies heavily on ex-ante selection of “good”
politicians, since it is limited in its ability to generate meaningful ex-post monitoring and
enforcement (Strøm, 2000). Parliamentary democracies typically achieve acceptable screening
of candidates through their parties, which are well positioned enough to deny unacceptable
27

candidates a chance at office. In Brazil, however, there is a parliamentary accountability model
(weak ex-post accountability) without strong ex-ante screening of candidates because politicians
select their parties, not the other way around. This is a recipe for weak democratic
accountability.
Policies that strengthen the legislative opposition will lead to better ex-post monitoring and
potentially even additional enforcement. A stronger opposition improves intra-legislative
monitoring, where opposition legislators hold majority legislators to account. It also improves
the independence of the legislature, which is supposed to provide oversight over executive
operations.
There are two ways in which the legislative opposition can improve its strength. It can improve
its proportion, so that it controls a larger voting weight. There are three key thresholds, where an
opposition with greater than 33% but less than 51% is in a position to block some legislation.
An opposition share of 51% to 66% marks a minority government, and an opposition share of
greater than 66% defines a super-minority government.
The opposition can also gain strength independently of how its voteshare changes. Even when
voteshare stays constant or falls, additional opposition legislatures introduce an enhanced
capacity to wage successful public relations campaigns against the majority. A larger group of
opposition legislators, regardless of whether they attain a formal voting threshold, eventually
reaches a critical mass where they can complicate parliamentary procedure and facilitate enough
meaningful public protest to draw unwanted attention to the majority’s actions.
It is not clear that a larger legislature would necessarily increase the proportion of opposition
legislators elected to office, but one would expect that it should increase the number of
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opposition legislators. There is at least anecdotal evidence that stronger oppositions, even if only
in numerical but not proportional terms, encourage greater legislative independence. The effects
of an increase in seats on opposition, measured both in numerical and proportional terms, are
estimated in the next section.
1.6.1 Descriptive Statistics for Opposition Variables
The means and standard deviations for the key variables used in the opposition analysis appear in
Table 1.4. Some of these variables are repeated from Table 1.2, like the seats, population, and
proportion of elections with an incumbent. There are two new variables related to the strength of
the opposition: the number of opposition legislators and the percent of the seats in the legislature
that is occupied by opposition politicians. The table shows that there are typically three or four
opposition legislators, which amounts to around 30% to 40% of the total seats. Remembering
that 33% is the magic number with which the opposition can begin to impede the mayor’s
legislative agenda, we see the stakes of adding or subtracting just one opposition legislator. For
many municipalities, just one more opposition legislator would be enough to change the formal
relationship of the mayor with the legislature.
1.6.2 Multivariate Results for Opposition Variables
The estimates from equations (1) and (2), using the opposition variables as the outcome, are
listed in Table 1.5. Opposition increases by between 0.4 and 0.5 legislators for an additional
seat. Alternatively stated, a municipality that increases its legislature by two or three seats
should expect one additional opposition councilor.
The percentage of councilors in the opposition does not change much as a result of the larger
councils. The estimates are all less than an additional 1 percentage point increase per seat, and
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three of the four estimates are not statistically different from zero. The instrumented models
appear to make a sizeable difference in the estimates of percentage opposition. Using the
estimate of 0.5 percentage point increase per seat, a municipality with an increase of five seats
would only expand their opposition voteshare by 2.5 percentage points. This might be enough to
take them over a threshold, but the effect will be important for only the most marginal elections.

1.7 CONCLUSION
The number of legislative seats in a district is an important institutional factor in political
competition. Most scholar studies have used the number of political parties as an outcome
variable, yet parties play little to no role in structuring political competition in some polities.
This paper examines the effect of a change in district magnitude on alternative conceptions of
political competition in Brazilian municipalities, including the number of coalitions and the size
of the opposition. Results show that the change in district magnitude has a significant impact on
the number of parties, but that the impact is only moderate with respect to the number of
coalitions, which is the more relevant outcome variable for competition in Brazilian
municipalities. The increase in district magnitude also increases the number of opposition
legislators, albeit not necessarily their proportion. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that a
greater number of opposition councilors, even if they do not have increased voting power, may
lead to additional independence of the legislature and government accountability.
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1.8 FIGURES

Important Events
*2004 - STF's Mira Estrela decision
limits the number of city councilors
*2009 - Congress passes the 58th
Amendment, increasing the maximum
number of city council seats

Figure 1-1: Municipal Population and City Council Representation, 2000 – 2012
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Figure 1-2: Selection of Municipalities for Case Study
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Figure 1-3: Trends for Number of Seats and Candidates in Selected Municipalities

Figure 1-4: Incidence of Municipal Parties in a Mayoral Coalition
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1.9 TABLES

Selected Municipalities for Interviews
Candidate Increase
Expected
Franco da Rocha
No Seat Increase
Salto
Large Seat Increase

Candidate Increase Not
Expected
Itu
Arujá, Barueri

Table 1.1: Selected Municipalities & Case Selection Criteria

Descriptive Statistics for Fragmentation Variables
2008
2012
Mean SD
Mean
Variable
14970 33069 15150
Size of Electorate
9.27
1.16
10.24
Seats
27.2
64.3
27.3
Population
56.12 44.28 73.35
Number of Candidates
3.32
1.48
3.22
Number of Coalitions
2.63
0.90
2.62
Number of Coalitions
with Seats
10.94 4.80
12.64
Number of Parties
5.59
1.54
6.40
Number of Parties with
Seats
0.57
0.49
0.44
Incumbent Mayor
Election
0.38
0.49
0.24
Incumbent Mayor Won
Election
5.82
3.44
6.62
Number of Candidates
Per Seat
57.08 13.80 56.08
Winning Vote Share
FS Share Difference

24.48

14.56

24.80

SD
32141
2.42
62.4
66.44
1.50
0.96
5.33
2.00
0.50

Yes/No

0.43

Yes/No

3.83
12.92
14.83

5501
Number of Observations 5495
*Brazilian Municipalities with fewer than 1M population
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for Fragmentation Variables
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Notes
Votes for Mayor
Number of Seats
1000s of people

Voteshare of winning
Mayor Candidate
Mayor Race: First to
Second Loser Voteshare

Summary of Effects of Seats on Outcome Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.227*** 0.215*** 0.272*** 0.255***
Number of Parties
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.416*** 0.412*** 0.430*** 0.425***
Number of Parties with a Seat
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.105*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.112***
Number of Mayoral Coalitions
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.145*** 0.147*** 0.152*** 0.156***
Number of Mayoral Coalitions
with a Legislative Seat
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.030
0.131*** -0.034
0.133***
Number of Mayoral Candidates
per Legislative Seat
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
-0.016
0.030
-0.128
-0.078
Winning Mayoral Voteshare
(0.14)
(0.13)
(0.18)
(0.18)
-0.099
-0.121
-0.270
-0.320
FS Share Difference
(0.22)
(0.22)
(0.31)
(0.31)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Municipal Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
No
No
Yes
Yes
Seats Instrumental Variable
No
Yes
No
Yes
Population & Incumbent
Controls
5498
5498
5498
5498
Number of Municipalities
BR Munis < 1M residents in 2008 & 2012
Population
Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates
significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level have three stars ***
Table 1.3: Summary of Effects of Seats on Fragmentation Outcome Variables
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Descriptive Statistics for Opposition Variables
2008
2012
Mean SD
Mean
Variable
9.27 1.16 10.24
Seats
27.2 64.3 27.3
Population
0.57 0.49 0.44
Incumbent Mayor Election
3.38 1.90 4.26
Number of Opposition
Legislators
36.52 19.97 41.51
Percentage of Opposition
Legislators
5495
5501
Number of Observations
*Brazilian Municipalities with fewer than 1M population

SD
2.42
62.4
0.50
2.26

Notes
Number of Seats
1000s of people
Yes/No

18.90

Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics for Opposition Variables

Summary of Effects of Seats on Opposition Outcome Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.441***
0.436***
0.489***
0.484***
Number of Opposition Legislators
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.155
0.096
0.510**
0.455*
Percent Opposition Legislators
(0.22)
(0.22)
(0.26)
(0.26)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Municipal Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
No
No
Yes
Yes
Seats Instrumental Variable
No
Yes
No
Yes
Population & Incumbent Controls
5498
5498
5498
5498
Number of Municipalities
BR
Munis
<
1M
residents
in
2008
&
2012
Population
Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates significantly different from zero at
the 99% confidence level have three stars ***

Table 1.5: Summary of Effects of Seats on Opposition Outcome Variables
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2 CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATURE SIZE AND PUBLIC SPENDING IN
BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The determinants of public spending levels and composition have long been the subject of
political and economic inquiry. Early research revolved around collective choice and recent
literature focuses on the role that political institutions play in shaping expenditures. A strand of
this work examines the importance of legislature size, particularly in political systems where the
legislature has fiscal primacy. I seek to develop and test a theory of how the legislature size
affects public spending in political systems where the president has principal budgeting authority
and must build a legislative coalition. I do so using the case of Brazilian municipalities.
This paper also serves as a policy evaluation. The recent increase in city council size is a topic
of controversy in Brazil, and academic work is underway to identify the effects of the policy.
This paper examines how it affected Brazilian municipal public spending, not only in magnitude,
but also in composition. Results indicate that larger legislatures led to higher public spending.
An average municipality that expanded from 10 to 15 legislators in 2013 spent 3% to 4% more
than a similarly situated municipality that maintained 10 legislators. This equals R$ 400k per
year, or 65 minimum wage jobs, per additional legislator. There was an appreciable increase in
urban infrastructure spending, while education expenditures did not change systematically in
response to larger local councils. The overall increase and the pattern of the increase are
consistent with the notion that Brazilian mayors use public spending to build and maintain their
legislative coalitions, and that they must appropriate more public funds to achieve these goals
when the legislature is larger.
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2.2 PUBLIC SPENDING LITERATURE
Scholars have found that many factors, beyond legislature size, contribute to public spending
magnitude and composition. Any empirical study of the relationship between council size and
spending must consider these theoretical factors and provide a convincing rationale for how the
research design excludes them from the causal effect attributed to council size. I discuss the
general determinants of public expenditures before moving onto the role that political institutions
and legislature size play in the size and composition of spending.
2.2.1 General Determinants of Public Expenditures
The seminal work on public goods expenditures was Paul Samuelson’s a normative theory of
public expenditures (Samuelson, 1954)7. He poses the optimal conditions for public sector
expenditure level and composition. He notes that while it might be theoretically possible to
solve his model for optimal public expenditures, it is not practically feasible for two reasons.
First, the model requires information about the costs and benefits of public and private services.
The problem that arises is that public sector benefits are unknown and cannot be easily
discovered. Residents will underreport how much they expect to benefit from a new public
service, lest costs end up allocated based on their reported benefits. Second, even if residents
sincerely disclosed their benefits from public sector goods, this information would only be
enough to calculate a Pareto-efficient frontier for production and consumption. In order to
determine a single best outcome, Samuelson’s model requires a social welfare function to
determine the optimal level and composition of public spending.

7

A review of the public expenditure literature is provided in (Shelton, 2007)
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Importantly, the Samuelson model views public expenditures as resulting from the interaction
between supply factors and collective demand. It is useful to organize our consideration of the
determinants of public expenditures around this supply and demand framework. Some research
has focused on the role that public sector efficiency and prices play in expenditures. The most
well-known of these is the Cost-Disease theory by (Baumol & Bowen, 1967), where the authors
suggest that rising costs of public services supposedly outpace the costs of private services.
Other authors have suggested the importance in accounting for the level of difficulty of
supplying public sector services in a given environment (Bradford, Malt, & Oates, 1969) and in
the management efficiency of the public sector organization (Duncombe & Yinger, 2011).
The demand for public sector goods, however, has dominated the political economy literature.
Scholars have sought to understand the underlying factors that determine the benefit people
receive from consuming public goods. Two factors are mainstays in calculating the demand for
a (public) good. They are income and population size (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973). Richer
countries tend to spend more money on public services, per capita. One longstanding theory,
Wagner’s Law, supplies a mechanical rational for this observation. The theory suggests that the
income elasticity of demand is elastic for public services – perhaps because people only begin to
value public goods after their basic needs are met. If this were true, then the demand for public
goods would rise disproportionately faster than the demand for private goods as a society
increases its wealth. There is also some evidence that public expenditures per capita decrease as
population rises (Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998). The theory suggests that larger populations might
be able to take advantage of scale economies in public services, but also that larger communities
will tend to be more heterogeneous preferences and their ability to settle on a common set of
public services could be inhibited for this reason.
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Economic inequality may also drive demand for public services. In countries where tax-payers
often pay different amounts based on their income levels but receive the same level of services,
poorer residents face a lower “tax-price” for public goods and thus demand more public
expenditures. This tax-price mechanism was put to work by (Meltzer & Richard, 1981) to show
how greater inequality can lead to larger public expenditures in a democracy.
The notion that heterogeneous communities would have a lower demand for public services is
prevalent in the literature because reduced expenditures where there is ethnic fragmentation is
observed in the data with great regularity. Among the suggested reasons for this pattern are
demand-side explanations such as preference heterogeneity and disutility of sharing public goods
with outsiders (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999). Other work on the role of ethnic
fragmentation in the provision of public goods has suggested there might be a supply-side effect,
where fragmentation inhibits the efficiency of provision (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, &
Weinstein, 2007).
Samuelson’s model shows that even if we understood all the relevant supply and collective
demand factors, the optimal public spending level and composition would not be obvious, since a
social welfare function is not available. Another method must be used to determine the final
spending level and composition. In a democracy, the principal method of collective decisionmaking is an election. Academic work has repeatedly found that changing electoral rules can
generate different electoral outcomes from the same underlying voter preferences8. It is not a far
reach to suppose that electoral rules and other political institutions might also affect public
spending. In fact, scholars have found that proportional representation (PR) electoral rules

8

See (Riker, 1982) for a review of the literature beginning with Condorcet.

42

generate higher levels of public spending (as transfers) than majoritarian electoral rules (MilesiFerretti, Perotti, & Rostagno, 2002) (Persson & Tabellini, 2004)9. The underlying logic here
appears to be that politicians in majoritarian systems are motivated to bring home local public
services, whereas politicians in proportional systems are rewarded for finding creative ways to
transfer resources to their constituent groups. Presidential systems often spend less than
parliamentary systems because the president is a separate line of accountability representing all
voters and therefore internalizing the full costs of public spending10. Similarly, nationalized
politics (national parties, unitary government) appear to create fewer pressures for public
spending because public resources are less necessary to gain the support of local politicians
(Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2008).
A substantial literature has also developed regarding “political business cycles,” where public
spending rises and falls in line with scheduled elections. The literature initially focused on the
incentives of government officials to stimulate the economy using monetary policy ahead of an
election goals (Hibbs, 1977; Nordhaus, 1975), but scholars quickly broadened the inquiry to how
incumbents use fiscal policy to achieve electoral (Drazen, 2001). The general argument is that
when conditions permit, incumbents will use monetary or fiscal policy immediately before an
election to stimulate the economy and then will adopt tighter policies after they are elected. The
Political Business Cycle (PBC) theory has been applied to local governments as well,
concentrating on their fiscal policy ahead of elections. There is anecdotal and statistical support
for the theory at the municipal level, though the severity of it depends on several factors

9

Samuelson’s framework is primarily directed at the collective purchase of public goods, and not at transfers
between political groups. The coercive nature of political institutions means that authors who focus on them as
factors in public spending may also theorize about transfers. This is important because they are a growing part of
public spending with the rise of the welfare state.
10
See (Eslava, 2011) for a survey of the causes of fiscal deficits, which are situations where revenues and
expenditures fail to balance.
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including institutional controls and fiscal transparency (Khemani, 2004; Sakurai & MenezesFilho, 2010).
2.2.2 Legislature Size and Public Expenditures
Another political institution that appears to affect public spending is the size of a legislature.
The literature on legislature size and public spending draws on a theory of logrolling that was
formalized in a paper by Barry Weingast in 1981 (Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981), where
spending increases in proportion to 1/n, with n equal to the number of legislators. The intuition
behind this model is a “tragedy of the budget commons,” where the spending benefits accrue to
legislators’ districts, but the costs are spread over the entire country. The Weingast paradigm is
appropriate for the single-member-district (SMD) characteristic of the United States’ electoral
system, where there are a large number of districts and only one representative per district. In
this model political bargaining is between districts. However, the political reality in many other
countries is one of multi-member districts, where the members serve as the political
representation of diverse social groups. Political conflict is then no longer between districts, but
rather between coalitions, and it can be expensive to hold them together into a governing
coalition. Public spending is therefore an indispensable resource to the government for
legislative support, and various works have found that spending is higher in Proportional
Representation (PR) than SMD electoral systems (Persson & Tabellini, 2002). There have been
various attempts to replace districts with coalitions in the Weingast model and to examine the
empirical relationship between government fragmentation and expenditures under the political
logic of coalition government. This literature was initiated as cross-national studies that
observed higher spending for more fragmented governing coalitions (Roubini & Sachs, 1989)
(Scartascini & Crain, 2002) (Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006). More recent sub-national studies,
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aimed at addressing methodological concerns with the cross-national studies, find similar results
(Baskaran, 2013).
The relationship between legislature size and public spending has taken on a distinctly subnational orientation in the empirical literature. Early empirical work tested the theory in US
States (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 2001) and US cities (MacDonald, 2008). More recent studies,
keeping with a general trend in the academic literature, have pursued better research designs to
eliminate potential institutional endogeneity (Egger & Koethenbuerger, 2010; PetterssonLidbom, 2012). There are two causes for concern that a correlational relationship between
legislature size and public spending are not necessarily causal. First is a reverse-causality story,
where polities with larger public sectors expand their legislatures in response to high public
spending. The optimistic version of this argument is that legislatures expand in order to provide
proper oversight (and perhaps lower spending). The cynical version is that legislatures expand
so that more of the political elite may extract benefits from society. If the benefits are limited
only to higher spending in the legislature, then the causal effect of larger legislatures on overall
public spending should be minimal. If, however, the new councilors are able to expand
government outlays, then legislature size would have causal force with respect to public
spending.
The second potentially confounding relationship could be that social or economic factors cause
voters to have a preference for both a large public sector and a larger legislature. This is a more
difficult argument to make on its face, since the main argument to have a larger legislature is to
accommodate social heterogeneity. However, social heterogeneity is generally thought to be a
factor in reducing public spending (Alesina et al., 1999) (Habyarimana et al., 2007), so one
would expect size of the legislature and public spending to move in opposite directions.
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In summary, the total level of public spending is influenced by many factors. As Samuelson and
subsequent research has shown, we observe spending outcomes that are determined by more than
just the supply and demand for collective purchases. We experience outcomes whereby the
supply and demand factors that have been filtered through political institutions. The remainder
of this paper focuses on how one of these institutions, legislature size, affects public spending in
a specific political context.

2.3 LEGISLATURE SIZE AND SPENDING IN BRAZIL
Previous research that focuses on public spending as function of legislature size does not quite fit
with the Brazilian experience. This is because in Brazil the ultimate budget authority rests with
the executive, rather than with the legislature or parliament. While the legislative branch in local
and national Brazilian governments formally approves a budget plan for each year, the executive
makes all appropriation decisions. If he or she refuses to release funds for a particular budgeted
item, then the spending simply does not occur. In this context, the logrolling paradigm pioneered
by Weingast cannot provide the reason for why larger legislatures might lead to higher spending
since the final appropriation decisions are made by the executive, who is accountable to all
districts. Nor are the coalition adaptations of Weingast’s theory a useful guide to the Brazilian
experience (Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006), since these theories assume that spending decisions are
made in the legislature by parties behaving in an essentially logrolling-type way.
The connection between legislature size and public spending is different in Brazil because it is
driven by the co-dependence of the executive and legislative branches. Brazil’s political
institutions are often described as “Presidential Parliamentarism,” since the executive is
independently elected and must build an electoral coalition of city councilors to carry out his
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legislative agenda. Without 67% of the legislators regularly voting with him, the executive can
expect opposition councilors to stymie his legislative agenda. City council elections are not
cheap in Brazil, so legislators pursue all advantages. They seek public sector jobs to reward
political operatives who supported them in the election, and they angle for public works projects
to burnish their reputation as a champion of the people. Since the mayor controls both jobs and
budget appropriations, he or she can credibly offer them in exchange for the legislators’ support.
In the context of Brazilian Presidential Parliamentarism, one might speak of a market for votes in
the legislature. The executive demands voting support for his or her agenda and pays for votes
with budget appropriations destined to legislators projects11. Legislators supply voting support
in exchange for the appropriations. This observation serves as the basis of the theoretical model
presented below.
Brazilian municipalities have been used to analyze a wide variety of political-economy problems
due to their broadly available data, high count, (formally) homogenous political institutions, and
a plethora of federal legislation that facilitates convenient statistical identification of policy
effects. Some of the more well-known work has investigated the response of voters to
information about corrupt politicians (Ferraz & Finan, 2008) and the political resource curse
(Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2010).
Brazilian municipal legislatures have undergone profound changes in recent years. Between
2000 and 2013, many of the country’s approximately 5,500 councils have seen the number of
seats reduced and then increased by as much as 40% - 50%. For some of the larger
municipalities, it was not uncommon to experience a fluctuation from 17 seats to 13 seats, and

11

The Mensalão scandal, discovered in 2005, was an example where the executive dispensed with indirect
payment of legislators and instead offered cash for votes.
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then finally back to 17 seats within the course of 8 years. This provides substantial temporal
variation that is an excellent starting point for estimating the impacts of city council size.
The dynamic between the executive and the legislative branch is comparable between the
Brazilian federal and municipal governments. In both cases, the executive is elected by
majoritarian vote, and the legislature is elected by open-list proportional representation. This
creates a situation at all levels of government where an independently elected executive must
negotiate with a legislature composed of many political parties. “Presidential Parliamentarism”
is in force at all levels of government, so the following theory does not distinguish between its
applications to the federal or local level.

2.4 A MODEL OF A MARKET FOR LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT
We can formalize the above discussion to gain further insight into the relationship between
legislature size and public spending in the Brazilian Presidential Parliamentary system. Figure
2-1 shows a special case of how an increase in legislature size would affect spending where the
executive exchanges fiscal expenditures for legislative support.
In Figure 2-1, the executive’s demand for votes in the legislature does not vary with respect to
the “price” of the legislative support. The demand for votes is perfectly inelastic, shown as the
vertical dotted lines 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 . The demand is set to 2/3 of the total number of legislature
seats12, based on the logic that the Brazilian executive must obtain the support of 2/3 of the
legislature in order to enact his or her agenda without interference. An inelastic demand for

12

The values assumed to construct this graphic are original number of seats = M = 10, change in seats = V = 4, slope
of S1 = b = 1, intercept of S1 and S2 = a = 1, slope of S2 = (slope of S1*original seats)/(original seats + change in
number of seats). This last slope emerges from the geometry of the supply curve hitting the maximum price at the
total number of legislative seats, M (or M+V in the case of S2)
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votes would occur where the executive is willing to pay any price in public budget resources to
ensure that he or she has 2/3 of the votes in the legislature.
The supply of votes in the legislature is responsive to the “price,” which is the amount of public
budget resources the executive appropriates for each legislator’s projects. The present model
assumes that there is a uniform market price. Additionally, the executive is able to obtain the
total number of votes if he or she is willing to pay the maximum price. For example, in 𝑆1 there
are 10 seats, and the executive who pays P=11 will have the support of all 10 seats. In 𝑆2 there
are 14 seats, and an executive willing to pay 11 will have all 14 seats. This geometry facilitates
analysis of the model.
Figure 2-1 shows how equilibrium spending changes between two periods as a result of a change
in the number of legislative seats. At point A, there are 10 seats. The executive “pays” P* in
order to obtain 2/3 of the seats13. When the size of the legislature expands, he or she will still
2

2

want 2/3 of the new seats, so the demand curve shifts from 𝐷1 = 3 𝑀 to 𝐷2 = 3 (𝑀 + 𝑉), where M
is the original number of seats and V is the change in the number of seats. With more total seats
available, there is also a shift in the supply of seats from 𝑆1 to 𝑆2 . These equations are defined
𝑏∗𝑀

by: 𝑝1𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑚, and 𝑝2𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑐 𝑚, with 𝑐 = 𝑀+𝑉 to ensure that both supply curves attain full
cooperation of all legislators at the maximum price.
Figure 2-1 depicts a situation where the new legislators have an overall profile where their
willingness to accept a piece of the public budget in exchange for their vote is relatively similar

13

The seats are assumed to be divisible to ease the analysis.
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to the legislators in 𝑆1. For this reason, the supply pivots to the right. The new equilibrium is
point B.
Under this model, the total spending must necessarily increase when the legislature expands. At
point B, the price must be identical to that of point A14 and there are more transactions that occur
because there are more seats. Total expenditures is equal to p*m, and increasing m while
maintaining p constant must increase total expenditures.
The above conclusion, in which an increase in seats leads to larger public expenditures, holds
true even in the general case where the slope of the demand curve is allowed to vary. In the
general model, presented in the Appendix, it is possible for the “price” of the votes to decline
and it will do so when twice the slope of 𝑆1 is less than the absolute value of the slope of 𝐷1 .
That is, the price of a vote can decline with the introduction of new seats when the legislators are
relatively sensitive to price and the mayor is relatively price insensitive. However, any
reductions in price are not be enough to overcome the increase in quantity of transactions in the
general model. Thus, the total expenditures must always go up when new seats are added to the
legislature.

2.5 POLITICAL AND BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES
There are approximately 5,500 municipalities in Brazil. They share similar political and
budgetary structure due to the 1988 Constitution and subsequent legislation. Elected officials
include the mayor and councilors in each municipality. The mayor is selected by simple
majority for municipalities with fewer than 200k inhabitants, and by absolute majority for larger

14

2

2

3

3

The price before the change is 𝑝1𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑚. After the expansion, 𝑝2𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑚, so 𝑝1𝑠 = 𝑝2𝑠
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cites. He or she then appoints the administration ministers and sets government policy for the
next four years. Councilors are elected at-large through an open-list proportional representation
(PR) system. There are often over 100 council candidates in an election due to vote transfers
among candidates and to the fact that councilors are generously compensated.
The budgeting process in Brazilian municipalities is regulated through the 1988 constitution15
and the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law16. The Pluriannual Plan is proposed every four years,
during the first year of a mayor’s term and is adopted in the second year of the term. It aims to
provide general guidance for the capital spending of the municipality. The Budget Direction Law
(LDO) is passed on an annual basis. It establishes a primary surplus goal for the following year,
and it projects expenditures and receipts for the next three years. Finally, the Annual Budget
Law (LOA) establishes the maximum spending amounts permissible across different expenditure
categories. The mayor appropriates money monthly and is permitted to spend less on an item
than is legislated in the LOA, but he may not spend more without seeking authorization from the
Legislature.
There are legal limits to municipal spending levels. The Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2000
imposed a debt ceiling on Brazilian municipalities. The municipalities were given 15 years to
comply with a rule that limits debt to 120% of annual receipts17. After 2016, non-compliant
municipalities lose their authorization to conduct credit operations and they become ineligible to
receive a significant portion of intergovernmental transfers. However, compliant municipalities
may take on additional debt as necessary and that might include when a mayor and legislature

15

Title VI, Chapter 2, Section 2 (of Budgets). Art. 165 – Art. 169

16

Lei Complementar No 101, 4 May 2000

17

The 120% rule is from Senate Resolution #40, 2001.
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has additional needs to spend money on coalition maintenance. Figure 2-2 shows that in 2012
and 2013 the modal debt as a percentage of revenues was 10%, well below the legal ceiling of
120%. As such, most municipalities have fiscal space to expand and contract public spending at
their discretion.
Some municipalities run annual deficits, and just as many run annual surpluses. Figure 2-3
shows that on average, municipalities tend to gravitate towards a situation of balanced revenues
and expenditures, where the Nominal Budget Deficit is zero18. It is also apparent from Figure 2-3
that nominal deficits were larger in 2013 than they were in 2012. From 2012 to 2013, almost all
of the bins above zero nominal deficit grew larger. While this chart does not provide causal
evidence that increased debts were a result of the seats expansions in 2013, the facts of Figure
2-3 fit with this overall story.
The number of municipal legislative seats grew significantly from 2012 to 2013. Figure 2-4
shows how the legislative seat count is distributed by city population in 2012 and 2013. From
2005 to 2012, the number of seats in each legislature was tightly regulated by population.
According to the 2004 Mira Estrela Supreme Court Decision, each municipality under 1M
inhabitants was granted nine seats for the first 47,619 inhabitants, plus one additional seat per
47,619 residents. This led to the seat-count pattern represented by the step-wise gray points in
Figure 2-4.
The 58th Amendment was passed in 2009 and came into effect with the 2012 election. The new
legislatures that were seated on January 2013 were significantly larger than those of 2012. For

18

The nominal budget deficit includes spending on the interest of previous municipal debt.
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municipalities with populations under 1.05 Million, the new seat limit amended Article 29, IV of
the Constitution to limit seats as:
m)
n)
o)
p)
q)
r)
s)
t)
u)
v)
w)
x)

9 councilors, in municipalities up until 15,000 inhabitants;
11 councilors, in municipalities of more than 15,000 and up until 30,000 inhabitants;
13 councilors, in municipalities of more than 30,000 and up until 50,000 inhabitants;
15 councilors, in municipalities of more than 50,000 and up until 80,000 inhabitants;
17 councilors, in municipalities of more than 80,000 and up until 120,000 inhabitants;
19 councilors, in municipalities of more than 120,000 and up until 160,000 inhabitants;
21 councilors, in municipalities of more than 160,000 and up until 300,000 inhabitants;
23 councilors, in municipalities of more than 300,000 and up until 450,000 inhabitants;
25 councilors, in municipalities of more than 450,000 and up until 600,000 inhabitants;
27 councilors, in municipalities of more than 600,000 and up until 750,000 inhabitants;
29 councilors, in municipalities of more than 750,000 and up until 900,000 inhabitants;
31 councilors, in municipalities of more than 900,000 and up until 1,050,000 inhabitants;

This represented a sizeable increase for many municipalities. For example, a city with a
population of 140,000 would have had 10 councilors in 2012 and then would have been
permitted to expand to 19 councilors in 2013. This is almost a 100% increase from one year to
the next, which provides a sizeable variation in the key explanatory variable from one year to the
next. While not every municipality expanded to this extent, many did increase the size of their
legislatures19.
The advantage of large and sudden changes in the explanatory variable means that several of the
potential determinants of public spending, as introduced in the literature review above, will not
have time to vary. Thus, we can exclude them as factors driving a change in public spending
from 2012 to 2013. For example, one could make a strong case that public service demand
factors such as income inequality or population would be relatively fixed between these two
years. Likewise, public sector supply factors such as factor prices and bureaucratic organization
probably did not change greatly between these two years for most municipalities. Finally,
political institutions, other than the size of the legislature, were also held relatively fixed from

19

The decision to expand was made at the municipal level, which introduces a concern with policy endogeneity.
Several estimation strategies are introduced below to check the potential bias that this would cause.
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2012 to 2013. To identify the effect of a change of the size of the legislature, this paper relies on
the slow-moving nature of many of the important factors that determine public expenditures, and
the fact that a change in legislature size should have acute effects that materialize immediately.
An instrumental variable strategy is also used to verify the robustness of the fixed effect model.

2.6 MODELS
This section establishes the empirical model used to estimate the effect of seats on public
spending and its components. Aside from the number of seats in a legislature, the explanatory
variables in the models are limited to time-variant factors that either have a large role in
explaining the dependent variable, or are a potential source of omitted variable bias.
2.6.1 Total Public Spending
The total public spending for a municipality is modeled as:
Spendit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 Seatsit + 𝛼2 Receiptsit + Xβ + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it

(1)

The dependent variable, Spend, is the (log) of a municipality i’s public spending, net of
legislative costs, in year t. Legislative costs are deducted from the spending variable because the
focus of this study is the extent to which a change in legislature size affects general public
spending, not legislature operations. The parameter of interest is 𝛼1 , which estimates the
percentage change in public spending for a percentage change in the number of legislative seats.
It is important to note that while 𝛼1 estimates the marginal change, many of the municipalities
had very large changes in their legislature sizes. As such, a simulation is conducted in the results
section to help the reader see the estimated effect of these larger changes, which were typical of
the 2012, 2013 policy change. The Receipts variable represents the total municipal revenues for
year t. There is no a priori reason to believe that its exclusion would cause bias in the estimate of
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𝛼1 . Nevertheless, it is time-variant and included in the model to take advantage of its strong
predictive power for municipal spending and the precision that this generates for estimating other
model parameters. An additional vector of control variables, contained in X, is included in the
model. In one specification, X contains a flexible set of population variables and in another
specification X also contains political variables to measure the strength of the opposition and
political fragmentation among parties. The political variables change from 2012 to 2013 because
there are separate legislatures sitting in these two years. Opposition strength and political
fragmentation might be expected to complicate a mayor’s ability to hold together a governing
coalition, and thereby increase expenditures. These political variables might also be related to
the municipality’s decision to adopt an increase in seats. For example, one potentially
problematic bias would be if incumbent mayors who faced strong opposition systematically
increased legislature size and raised public expenditures to manage their coalitions. The
municipality fixed effect, 𝛾𝑖 , absorbs all the slow-moving variables that theoretically affect
public spending. Variables that are relatively fixed over the two-year time period that affect the
supply and demand of public services and political institutions are contained in 𝛾𝑖 . The time
fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡 , absorbs general Brazil-wide trends that increased or decreased spending in
municipalities.
2.6.2 Spending Composition
The composition of public expenditures is also modeled to investigate whether there are general
patterns in how larger legislatures affect spending. Research into spending composition must
establish a meaningful typology of spending accounts. Studies conducted at a national-level
have focused on a distinction between “universal” and “targeted” spending (Tabellini, 2002), or
between “transfers” and “public-goods” spending (Milesi-Ferretti et al, 2002). In a local setting,
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however, many of the social insurance programs are outside the discretion of the government.
The relevant decision of the local government is to spend money on direct support of its political
base (e.g. spending on appointed positions, targeted infrastructure projects) or on broad public
services (e.g. health, education) for which it is more difficult for politicians to claim credit.
This section of the paper examines the hypothesis that additional funds were directed to four
functional spending categories: (A) Administration (B) Urban Infrastructure (C) Health, and (D)
Education. These are the four largest functional spending categories in Brazilian municipal
government over the past decade. The functional categories unfortunately mix current and
capital spending. For example, a new school or new hospital construction would fall into Health
or Education spending. Urban Infrastructure includes current and capital expenditures on public
works.
Elected governments must provision funds for direct administration and capital spending, but
there is also evidence that governments in politically underdeveloped areas tend to overspend in
these areas relative to “human development” expenditures on health and education (Delavallade,
2006; Mauro, 1998). Administration and urban infrastructure spending is potentially more useful
to shore up a political base, since it is spending for which credit can be claimed by individual
politicians. In the case of administration, many jobs are appointed at the discretion of political
leadership. In the case of infrastructure, mayors imply in public fora that a neighborhood
legislator was instrumental in procuring a given public work (if he happens to be part of the
government coalition, of course). Additionally, infrastructure spending is more conducive to
corruption since contracts are large, complex and ripe for kickbacks.
Health and education spending is less traceable to any particular politician since it passes through
a bureaucratic organization before arriving to the general population. The public service is
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provided by professionalized corps of teachers and health workers, and is typically distributed
only on the pre-condition of being a member of the community. Given its retail-style nature, it is
more difficult (and less profitable) to ration in exchange for political support.
The four spending categories are modeled as:
SpendCategoryit = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 Seatsit + 𝜋2 Receiptsit + X𝜃 + 𝜓𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜈it

(2)

The model in equation (2) is identical to that of equation (1), except that the dependent variable
is spending on Administration, Infrastructure, Health, or Education. All measures are the same
and the unit interpretations of the parameters in (2) are equivalent to equation (1).
2.6.3 Model Estimation
To obtain unbiased causal estimates of 𝛼1 and 𝜋1 , one must ensure that the size of the legislature is
not correlated with any omitted factors that also explain the size or composition of public spending. The

main issue of concern is that the choice to increase the number of legislature seats in 2013 is a
decision that is made by each municipality. Cities with larger legislatures might also be the same
kind of cities that have higher spending levels. As such, any systematic correlation between
Seats and Spending could actually be driven by those unobserved features of the politics or
society those certain municipalities. I use two approaches, fixed-effects and instrumentalvariable estimation, to address these research challenges.
As discussed above, the large variation in seat sizes and the theoretical absence of lag effects
prove suitable to the use of municipal fixed effects. The baseline estimation provided below is
OLS using fixed effects to remove persistent municipal features like social, economic, or
political structure. The standard errors are clustered by municipality.
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The model is also estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) as an additional check that
the fixed effect model has addressed the potential endogeneity. The first stage estimates the
predicted number of seats that a municipality would have based on the federal guidelines in 2012
and 2013. The change in guidelines between these two years is exogenous to the choices of the
municipalities, provides adequate temporal variation, and is significantly predictive of the
change in number of seats in municipalities.
The model is estimated using the log of the dependent variable, non-legislative spending.
Models are also estimated where the independent variable of interest, the number of seats, enters
into the model untransformed (level) and as a logged variable. The correct model depends on
whether we think the percentage change in expenditures is a reflection of the change in number
of seats or a change in the percentage of the number of seats. For example, the effect of an
increase of five seats would be seen as equivalent by the Log-Level model across all municipal
sizes, but for the Log-Log model it would make a difference if those five seats were added to a
small legislature vs added to an already large legislature. The Log-Log model is correct if we
think there is diminishing effect of adding seats on spending. Both approaches are estimated and
shown to be roughly similar across the relevant domain of legislature sizes.

2.7 DATA & DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Municipal spending and revenue data are from the “Finances Brasil” (FINBRA) dataset,
published annually by the Brazilian Treasury in the Ministry of Finance. The spending
categories are based on the FINBRA accounts, which are documented in Brazil’s system of
public accounts (Brazil National Treasury, 2013). The spending and revenue data are deflated to
2010 Reais using the World Bank’s country deflator series for Brazil. This paper uses the
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population data from FINBRA. It was cross-checked with the official population data from the
Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE) and is nearly identical.
All data for political variables are from the Brazilian Electoral Authority, the Tribunal Superior
Eleitoral (TSE). For each election, the TSE publishes candidate-level information for all
municipalities. Information on Mayoral and Council races is available country-wide, and is used
not only to measure the number of seats available in each year, but also to measure the size of the
opposition and number of parties in each municipality. The size of the opposition is defined as
the number of legislators that are elected to the council from coalitions that are not affiliated with
the mayor-elect’s coalition. It is true that there is significant pressure on city councilors to join
the mayor’s coalition, even if they were not originally elected as part of that coalition, so this
measure is likely to be an imperfect proxy for opposition. The imprecision is likely more severe
in the 4th year of a term (e.g. 2013) rather than in the first year of a mayoral term (e.g. 2013),
because legislators have more time to switch parties.
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables and observations used in the model.
The research is restricted to municipalities with populations under 1 million and over 10,000 in
line with (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012) and other work that excludes small jurisdictions on the
apparent grounds that the politics of small communities limits the extent to which politicians can
expand or contract public spending to deal with maintenance of political coalitions. As a result,
the sample is roughly 2500 municipalities. On average, the total spending is 108 in 2012 and 122
in 2013, indicating an approximate 13% jump in real expenditures between these years. The
average number of Legislature Seats also grew from 9.5 to 11. The average percentage of
opposition in the legislatures saw a mild increase and so did the number of parties in each
legislature.
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Spending on Education (34.2%), Health (23.9%), Administration (14.0%), and Infrastructure
(8.0%) were the largest municipal expenditure categories in 201320. Together, these four
categories accounted for 80% of all municipal expenditures. Since 2002, there has been a
general trend of increasing the priority of education (up from 29.8%) and health expenditures (up
from 18.7%), while the share of expenditures to administration (down from 16.7%) and urban
infrastructure (down from 9.9%) has fallen.
The distribution of the shares spent on the big four municipal services is shown in Figure 2-5.
The numbers cited above are averages, and Figure 2-5 illustrates the large variance in spending
on services. This variation in our dependent variables will likely reduce the precision of the
estimates in the spending category models.

2.8 RESULTS
The estimates for equation (1) are listed in Table 2.2. The first row of coefficients are from the
Log-Log model, where the log of the total expenditures is regressed on the log of the number of
seats (and control variables). The third row of the table contains coefficients from the regression
of the log of total expenditures on the non-logged number of seats. Each column provides a
variation on equation (1). The first two models are the OLS and instrumented versions without
the additional controls. The third and fourth models are the regular and instrumented versions of
equation 1 with the additional controls.
The estimates of the effect are consistent across each of the model rows, although the estimates
are less precise for the 2SLS estimates due to a loss of power associated with the two stages.

20

Again, this is for Brazilian municipalities with greater than 10k and fewer than 1M people.
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Nevertheless, the inclusion of the 2SLS models shows that the fixed effects method does a good
job of managing bias from the endogeneity of public spending and legislature size.
The Log-Log model indicates that 𝛼1 is approximately equal to 0.09. This means that a one
percent change in seats is associated with a 0.09% increase in total expenditures. Municipal
legislatures experienced seat changes of 40% or 50%. These increases are sufficiently larger
than 1% that a simulation is preferable to understand the expected increases associated with such
large expansions of the legislature. Comparing the predicted values of two average
municipalities (those with the mean values of the regression population on every variable except
the number of seats), with 10 seats and 15 seats, the effect of 50% more legislators is 3.2%21.
The same exercising comparing a change between 10 and 15 seats with the Log-Level model
leads to an estimated effect of a spending increase of 3.17%22.
The estimates suggest that a municipality that increased its legislature from 10 to 15
representatives would expect to see an increase in spending of approximately 3% - 4%. Given
that the average municipality has expenditures of around R$ 65 million per year (in 2010 Reais),
an increase of 3% is R$ 1.95 million. Considering a 2010 minimum wage of R$ 510, this kind of
spending increase would support approximately 320 annual minimum wage jobs. Split 5 ways
between the new legislators, this is R$ 390k of additional spending per additional legislator, or
64 minimum wage jobs, in the average municipality of 50,000 residents.

21

Predicted spending on non-legislative activities for an average municipality with a legislature of 10 is
R$ 65,170,996, and 67,631,400 for a legislature of 15. The percentage effect is (67,631,400 – 65,170,996) /
65,170,996 = 3.8%
22
The percentage effect is (66,829,960 – 64,779,624)/64,779,624 = 3.2%
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2.8.1 Results for Spending Subcategories
The estimates for the effect of legislative seats on the big four municipal expenditures are shown
in Table 2.3. The coefficients represent the percent change in categorical spending for a one %
change in seats, or a one seat change, depending on whether one looks at the log-log or log-level
model.

The estimated effect of a change in seats on urban infrastructure spending is the most
pronounced. The OLS estimates are statistically positive, and the 2SLS estimates for urban
infrastructure, while not statistically different from zero, indicate that the OLS estimates may
have some downward bias. Using 𝜋1 = 0.3 for the log-log model, this indicates that an increase
of 0.3% of spending is expected for a 1% change in seats. For municipalities that increased their
legislatures by 40% or 50%, that is a substantial increase in infrastructure spending of
approximately 10%.
The estimates for the effect of a change in seats on health or administration spending is more
ambiguous. For health spending, the OLS estimates indicate half the size of the effect as is
associated with urban infrastructure spending, but the 2SLS estimates suggest that there is some
bias and adjusting for it makes the estimate close to zero and with large confidence bounds. The
effect on health spending appears as if it might be moderately positive since it is consistently
estimated as so across all specifications, but the error bounds are just large enough to prevent us
from saying they are statistically different from zero at conventional confidence levels.
The effect of a change in seats on education spending is estimated near zero with small enough
standard errors that we can say that the effect is statistically and economically close to zero.
Education spending, in other words, appears less sensitive to changing legislature size, at least in
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the short run. This makes sense, because municipal education spending is highly regulated by
the federal government.
On the other hand, the expected change in spending for urban infrastructure due to a change in
seats is very high. The estimates are approximately 0.25 to 0.3 for the OLS models, and
approximately 0.43 for the 2SLS models. The 95% confidence interval for the OLS models is
between 0.2 and 0.4, meaning that a municipality where seats increased from 10 to 15 could
expect to see a 10% - 20% increase in infrastructure spending in 2013. The estimates would be
even higher if we resort to the 2SLS estimates. The estimates for administrative and health
spending are too noisy to conclude they are different from zero, but they are clearly below the
effect that seat expansion has on infrastructure spending.
This change in spending patterns indicates that the increase in public spending due to the
increase in legislature size falls disproportionately into categories like urban infrastructure (and
perhaps administration) that are more discretionary and less programmatic than health and
education. While programmatic spending on health and education is electorally useful to the
executive, its encompassing nature is less beneficial to individual legislators. The empirical
findings fit broadly with our model, where the public sector grows with a larger legislature
because the executive exchanges public spending for legislative support.

2.9 CONCLUSION
Over half a century of research in public finance and political sciences have identified a broad
range of factors that contribute to the level and composition of public spending. Recent literature
has focused on political factors including how the legislature size affects spending. The dominant
theoretical approach to the impact of legislature size on spending has been that larger legislatures
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lead to higher spending through log-rolling. This paper follows a different approach that applies
to coalition governments where the executive has ultimate budget authority and must spend
fiscal resources to maintain his or her coalition. A model is developed that shows how
expansions of the legislature in Presidential-Parliamentary systems must lead to higher cost of
coalition maintenance, and a larger public sector.
The paper estimates the extent to which larger municipal legislatures affected public spending
and public composition in Brazil, where the data and institutional context are conducive to
estimating this relationship. Results indicate that a 50% increase in legislature size from 10 to 15
seats leads to an expansion of between 3% and 4% in public expenditures. Education
expenditures hardly change in response to legislature growth, whereas urban infrastructure
spending grew by approximately 10% for a 50% increase in legislative seats. The large growth
in infrastructure can be squared with the smaller growth in overall spending, since infrastructure
spending represents a smaller share of the municipality’s overall budgetary commitment. These
findings are in line with other scholarship that points to the political usefulness of infrastructure
spending and are also consistent with previous literature that points to larger legislatures as a
source of higher public expenditures.
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2.10 FIGURES

Figure 2-1: Market for Legislative Support

Figure 2-2: Distribution of Municipal Debt to Current Receipts
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Figure 2-3: Distribution of Annual Nominal Deficit

Figure 2-4: Population and Number of Council Seats
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Distribution of Municipalities' Spending on Services
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2.11 TABLES
Descriptive Statistics
Total Spending

Seats
Revenues

Population
Opposition
Parties in Legislature

2012
108

2013
122

(219)
9.57
(1.6)
114

(253)
11.08
(2.9)
129

(236)
48670
(84573)
45.1
(19)
5.97
(1.6)

(270)
47099
(83020)
48.9
(19)
7.14
(2.1)

Units
Million Reais
(2010)
Count
Million Reais
(2010)
People
Percent
Count

*Means and (standard deviations) for 2012 and 2013. Population is all Brazilian
Municipalities between 10k and 1M inhabitants.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics

Public Spending in Brazilian Municipalities, 2012 & 2013
Number of Seats (Log-Log)
Number of Seats (Log-Level)
Additional Controls
Instrumented
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
N

OLS1
0.091***
(0.025)
0.006***
(0.002)
No
No
Yes
Yes
5120

2SLS1
0.073
(0.056)
0.006
(0.004)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
5120

OLS2
0.094***
(0.028)
0.006***
(0.002)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
5022

2SLS2
0.089
(0.066)
0.007
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5022

Dependent variable is the Log of total municipal spending, net of direct spending on the legislature.
Standard controls include logs of Total Receipts, Population, Population Squared, and Population
Cubed. Additional controls include logged opposition percentage and the Number of Parties.
Population of interest is Brazilian Municipalities with between 10k and 1M inhabitants. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses below point estimates. Within r2 are about 0.97, and
between r2 are 0.93. Statistical significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.

Table 2.2: Public Spending in Brazilian Municipalities
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The Effect of a Change in Number of Legislature Seats on Public Spending
Categories
Spending Category \ Model
Administration

Log-Log
Log-Level

Urban
Infrastructure

Log-Log
Log-Level

Health

Log-Log
Log-Level

Education

Log-Log
Log-Level

N
Additional Controls
Instrumented
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed
Effects

OLS1

2SLS1

OLS2

2SLS2

0.165***
(0.052)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.293***
(0.100)
0.022***
(0.007)
0.047
(0.031)
0.004
(0.002)
0.036*
(0.021)
0.002
(0.001)

-0.051
(0.125)
-0.009
(0.010)
0.434*
(0.247)
0.039**
(0.020)
0.115
(0.076)
0.009
(0.006)
0.037
(0.061)
0.002
(0.005)

0.180***
(0.060)
0.007
(0.007)
0.245**
(0.112)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.066*
(0.036)
0.004
(0.003)
0.030
(0.025)
0.001
(0.002)

-0.040
(0.151)
-0.010
(0.012)
0.427
(0.295)
0.039*
(0.024)
0.158*
(0.091)
0.012
(0.007)
0.028
(0.074)
0.001
(0.006)

~5100
No
No
Yes
Yes

~5100
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

~5100
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

~5100
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

*The dependent variables are logged Brazilian Reais (2010 real) spent on Admin, Infrastructure, Health, or
Education. The explanatory variable of interest is logged or level number of legislative seats. Standard
controls include logs of Total Receipts, Population, Population Squared, and Population Cubed. Additional
controls include logged opposition percentage and the Number of Parties. Population of interest are
Brazilian Municipalities with between 10k and 1M inhabitants. Standard errors, robust and clustered by
municipality, are shown in parentheses below point estimates. The exact number of observations is not given,
since there is minor variation across each of the spending categories. Statistical significance is indicated at
the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.

Table 2.3: The Effect of a Change in Number of Legislature Seats on Public Spending Categories
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2.13 APPENDIX: THE MARKET FOR VOTES, A GENERAL MODEL
The structure of the supply curves remains the same as introduced in the body of the paper.
When the number of legislative seats changes by V, the supply of votes shifts from 𝑆1 to 𝑆2 .
Notice that at the maximum price, the supply curve is consistent with the total number of seats,
either M or M+V.

Figure 2-6: Market for Legislative Support (General Model)

The primary difference between this model and that introduced in the text is that the slope of the
demand curve is allowed to vary. As before, the task is to identify whether a change in the
number of seats leads to a larger or smaller level of public spending, where the executive “buys”
votes by making special appropriations for legislator’s projects. The quantity of votes purchased
is m, and the price at which they are purchased is p. The equations for the supply and demand
curves before (1) and after (2) the change in legislative seats (V), are:
𝑆1 : 𝑝1𝑆 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑚

(A1)

𝑆2 : 𝑝1𝑆 = 𝑎 + 𝑐𝑚

(A2)

𝐷1 : 𝑝2𝐷 = 𝑗 + 𝑑𝑚

(A3)

𝐷2 : 𝑝2𝐷 = 𝑘 + 𝑑𝑚

(A4)
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A number of parameters can be calculated once we have a, b, d, the original number of seats, M,
𝑏𝑀

and the change in the seats, V. We can calculate 𝑐 = 𝑀+𝑉, since 𝑆2 is restricted to attaining the
same maximum price as 𝑆1 at the maximum number of potential seats. 𝑗 = −𝑑 𝑀, since all
2

votes will be demanded at a price of zero. 𝑘 = −𝑑 ∗ (3 𝑉 + 𝑀) since 𝐷2 is a rightward shift of
2
3

𝑉 from 𝐷1 . In order to illustrate these relationships, Figure 2-6 assumes that the demand curve

slope is d = -1. The supply curve intercept, a, is shown as a = 0, and the supply curve slope for
𝑆1 is b = 1.
To reiterate the main goal, we want to understand how spending changes with respect to a
change in the size of the legislature. Spending is equal to the total number of votes purchased
times the cost of the votes, so Spending = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑚. Both price and quantity change with respect
to the change in the number of seats, dV, so find the concept of interest using:
𝜕Spending
𝜕𝑉

𝜕𝑚

𝜕𝑝

= 𝑝 𝜕𝑉 + 𝑚 𝜕𝑉

(A5)

Where p and m are the equilibrium price and quantity of votes exchanged in the first period.
Calculate these values first. They are:
𝑚1∗ = −
𝑝1∗ = −

𝑎+𝑑𝑀

(A6)

𝑏−𝑑

𝑑(𝑎+𝑏𝑀)

(A7)

𝑏−𝑑

Calculate how m and p change with respect to V by first finding the equilibrium quantity and
price in the second period (when V has been introduced), and then take their derivatives with
respect to V.
𝑚2∗ = −

(𝑀+𝑉)(3𝑎+3𝑑𝑀+2𝑑𝑉)
3𝑏𝑀−3𝑑(𝑀+𝑉)
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(A8)

𝑝2∗ = −
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑉

𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑉

=

𝑑(3𝑎(𝑀+𝑉)+𝑏𝑀(3𝑀+2𝑉))
3𝑏𝑀−3𝑑(𝑀+𝑉)

−3𝑎𝑏𝑀+𝑑(2𝑑(𝑀+𝑉)2 −𝑏𝑀(5𝑀+4𝑉))

=−

3(𝑏𝑀−𝑑(𝑀+𝑉))2

𝑏𝑑𝑀(3𝑎+(2𝑏+𝑑)𝑀)
3(𝑏𝑀−𝑑(𝑀+𝑉))2

(A9)

(A10)

(A11)

Before proceeding to the final equation, it is worthwhile to examine the components of A5
individually. The following are acceptable ranges for the parameters.
−∞ ≤ 𝑎 ≤ ∞
0≤𝑏≤∞
0≤𝑚≤𝑀
0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑀
−∞ ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 0
−∞ ≤ 𝑉 ≤ ∞
0≤𝑀≤∞
𝑚1∗ and 𝑝1∗ will always be positive. This leaves whether total spending goes up or down to the
terms

𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑉

𝜕𝑝

and 𝜕𝑉. Further assuming that the change in seats, V, is positive, then

𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑉

could be

signed if it were not for the “a” term in the numerator. However, a must be sufficiently large to
prevent

𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑉

from going negative. In the numeric case similar to what we have been using above

where M = 10, V = 3, b = 1, d = -1, then a would need to be greater than 32, which is even
bigger than k = 12 in this case. In other words, an increase in seats almost always increases the
number of votes exchanged, practically speaking.
The key factor is

𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑉

, which can be either negative or positive. In the case that it is positive, then

total spending must increase, since it is the only term that can possibly be negative. If it is
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negative, then it must be sufficiently negative to offset the increase in seats exchanged and cause
total spending to decrease. Most of equation (A11) can be signed except two terms make its
direction indeterminate. The a term can cause the whole equation to be negative if a is
sufficiently negative, but the magnitude to which this must be true is substantial. The more
important issue is the term, (2b+d). Since d is a negative number, we do not know whether this
whole term is negative or positive. If 2b > -d, then price will increase with respect to an increase
in seats. In other words, the relative slopes of the supply and demand curves play a key role in
deciding whether vote price goes up or down in response to an increased number of seats.
To determine the total effect, substitute equations A6, A7, A10 & A11 into equation A5. The
result is complex and difficult to simplify. If, however, we assume that a = 0 as in our above
examples, then a more tractable result emerges.
𝜕Spending
𝜕𝑉

Here, we can sign

𝜕Spending
𝜕𝑉

=

𝑏𝑑2 𝑀(𝑏𝑀(7𝑀+4𝑉)−𝑑(𝑀2 +4𝑀𝑉+2𝑉 2 ))
3(𝑏−𝑑)(𝑏𝑀−𝑑(𝑀+𝑉))2

(A12)

as positive. That is, if the a term is within a reasonable range, then

spending must increase with respect to an increase in the number of seats.
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3 CHAPTER 3: REALLOCATION OF EARMARKED HIGHWAY
FUNDS UNDER A COSTLY BUDGETING PROCESS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The practice of earmarking, or designating the proceeds from particular revenue sources to specific
expenditure categories, is a common concern in public budgets. Scholars have asked whether the
practice is economically efficient, whether it increases public expenditures (Buchanan, 1963,
Athanassakos, 1990), and why it happens (Bös, 2000). Many have also asked whether authorities
actually comply with the spirit of the earmarking laws, given that monies can be reshuffled across
accounts to ensure merely formal compliance (Nesbit & Kreft, 2009). On this last point, the
theoretical expectations and empirical findings in academic literature have long been at odds. If a
government already spends in excess of new earmarked revenue, the budget authorities can claim
that they are in formal compliance with the earmarking law (Wilde, 1968). They are then free to
allocate money as if the earmarking law was never imposed. In this case, the theory goes, they will
simply allocate the budget to various expenditure categories based on their marginal propensity to
consume those goods out of new income. The result is that marginal increases in the earmarked
revenue will lead to less than a one-for-one increase in spending on the earmarked good.
Empirical research often finds the contrary: An extra dollar of earmarked revenues leads to larger
spending changes than would be suggested by the marginal propensity to consume that good from
income. When intergovernmental aid leads to overall larger public expenditures than if all
taxpayers had been given the same money, this is the “fly-paper effect” in the academic research23.
The “flypaper” term has also been used more loosely to describe situations where federal aid fails

23

See (Fisher, 1982) and (Hines & Thaler, 1995) for reviews of this literature.
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to crowd out other state spending (Knight, 2002), and when earmarks fail to crowd out spending
on earmarked spending categories (Gamkhar, 2000, 2003; Nesbit & Kreft, 2009). A number of
mechanisms have been proposed to explain why the empirical results diverge so greatly from the
theory. This paper adds one more: costly budgeting procedures.
The seeming contradiction between theory and experience disappears when the administrative
costs of re-appropriating earmarked money are considered. If reallocation costs are zero, then the
normal view of earmarks prevails in that expenditures should grow in line with the marginal
propensity to consume from new (earmarked) income. On the other hand, a perfect flypaper effect
is obtained by assuming reallocation costs are infinite. Infinite reallocation costs entail that 100%
of the earmarked income will be spent on the earmarked category.
Legislators can typically reassign earmarked funds with some effort, which suggests that the
realistic assumption is that costs are positive but not infinite. Furthermore, heterogeneity among
governments means that some will be willing to pay these costs to optimize their expenditures,
while others will not find it worthwhile. Aside from costs, I introduce another important source
of heterogeneity, which is the extent to which governments rely on earmarked expenditures. Given
equal income and preferences, governments that receive a larger share of the revenues as earmarks
have more to gain from re-allocation. I suggest that these governments should be more willing
than others to undertake a costly budgeting process in order to re-allocate earmarked funds to other
uses.
The theory is developed and illustrated using data from Oklahoma County governments from 1973
to 2012. The context within which the theory is explored is a familiar one. Natural resource
revenues are earmarked for spending on infrastructure projects. In 2013, 34 US States had
severance taxes, and 24 of those states had earmarked the revenues for a particular use. The most
78

common dedicated uses are for highways, education, conservation, and natural resource
management (Brown, 2013). As shale gas production in the US has increased, there has been
additional interest in levying severance taxes and much of the proposed legislation makes
provisions for earmarking the additional revenue. The literature on earmarking and the flypaper
effect is useful for understanding the effects of marginal funding changes.
I present results that indicate evidence is in line with the theory. I find that the typically large
spending effect of earmarked revenues is mitigated by a county’s reliance on those revenues as a
share of its overall budget.
The implications of this theory are important. It implies that the ability of earmarks to stimulate
specific expenditures will be effective at low levels, but lose force as they become a larger portion
of a budget authority’s total revenues. Earmarked revenue can increase expenditures in a desired
policy area if the costs of re-allocating those funds are sufficiently high. However, as the
earmarked funds play a mounting role in the overall budget of the government, there will be an
increasing push to incur the re-allocation costs and appropriate the funds for more beneficial uses.

3.2 THEORY AND LITERATURE
Consumer theory is often used to understand the behavior of governments that receive aid (Wilde,
1968). The parallel is drawn between governments that receive earmarked vs. general transfers
and individuals who receive in-kind vs. lump-sum assistance. Those who receive lump-sum
assistance are at least as well off, and possibly better off, than those receiving in-kind assistance
since they can allocate the fungible dollars however they see fit. In the case where the in-kind
transfer is not practically binding, then they should offer the same welfare increase. Several
authors have recognized that the parallel between consumer theory and government budgeting is
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not perfect because of the collective nature of the government decision making process (Bradford
& Oates, 1971; Wilde, 1968). However, the consumer theory analysis still provides a valuable
starting point. It is depicted in Panel A of Figure 3-1, which illustrates the budget allocation
decisions of a government choosing between highway spending and expenditures on all other
government activities. The government has a limited amount of total budget resources, shown by
the budget constraint line S.
3.2.1 Budgeting Costs
Given the shape of its utility curves, the government selects the optimal point on the budget
constraint S, point A, where it has allocated its resources to purchase half highways and the other
half government services24. If the government were to receive an influx of highway-earmarked
funding, then its budget constraint would shift horizontally to the right to S’. To stay in formal
compliance with the earmarking law, the government would have to spend at least the amount of
the earmarked revenue on highways. Graphically, it would have to buy more highway than the
location of the kink in the second budget constraint. This would not be a problem in the illustrated
case, since the earmark is not practically binding. In other words, it will easily spend the minimum
required by the earmarking rule. Just as in the case of a transfer of general funds, the government
has just received an influx in income it will expand its purchases in line with its marginal
propensity to consume out of new income. Thus, conventional economic theory reasons, the
municipality will end up at point B. The government is formally in compliance with the earmarking
law at point B, and it is also maximizing the welfare of the community.

24

This is not so different than the allocation made by Oklahoma counties. On average, they spend about 40% of
their revenues on highways.
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The trouble with this rationale is that a great deal of academic literature finds that new earmarked
income does not cause expenditures to expand from point A to point B. Earmarked income is
somehow different from general income, in that it appears to cause expenditures to expand from
point A to point C. That is to say that the full amount of the marginal highway-earmarked revenues
is allocated to highway expenditures. Explanations for the causes behind this phenomenon and the
closely related flypaper effect are numerous, but none point to transaction costs in the budgeting
process as a potential mechanism.
The budgeting process of a government is a costly, time-intensive affair. This is true even for
relatively small governments. Earmarked revenues often flow directly into designated accounts,
called Funds. When a government has the authority to transfer money away from these funds, it
often does so. As McCleary describes a World Bank survey on earmarking highway funds found:
Allocations for road funds appear to depend on the condition of the general budget. When money
is tight, earmarked funds may be temporarily frozen (as happened in Ghana) or diverted to other
uses (as in Mali)…(McCleary, 1991, p92)

These experiences are common, and they show that reallocating earmarked funds is possible.
However, this does not mean that diverting money away from an earmarked fund is free or easy.
A budget committee must convene meetings, review reallocation proposals, hear stakeholders, and
ultimately rule on how much money to transfer, and to which accounts. Unless there is pressing
need to reallocate money, legislators and the budgetary authority might not be willing to spend
their time and effort on this task, especially since budget debates tend to re-open previously settle
decisions.
The decision to reallocate money away from an earmarked fund differs under the conditions of a
costly budgeting process. In terms of Panel B in Figure 3-1, the decision to reallocate earmarked
revenues incurs a fixed cost, labelled L, which shifts the government’s budget constraint inward
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to the dotted line, labeled S”. If a government wanted to re-allocate the funds, it would pay L and
end up at point D. If the cost of reallocating revenue is positive, then the traditional narrow view
of an optimizing budget committee does not hold. Put differently, the government cannot move
to point B because that point is not available in the presence of budgetary transaction costs. Under
a budgeting procedure that incurs sufficiently large costs, the government achieves the welfaremaximizing result by avoiding paying those costs staying at point C. This can be seen in Panel B
of Figure 3-1, with large costs inducing the government to stay at point C where it gains utility of
U” rather than falling to the lower utility level of U’’’ associated with point D.
Where the budgeting costs are smaller, such as those shown in Panel C of Figure 3-1, the
government may elect to pay those costs in order to optimize its consumption bundle. The Panel
C scenario suggests that a government facing a small L would move to point D since the utility
levels, U’’’, associated with it are higher than the utility levels associated with a 100% increase in
highway funding, U’’. If the costs go to zero, then the situation converges upon the traditional
analysis of lump-sum vs. earmarked revenues depicted in Panel A.

Governments should

immediately optimize their consumption bundle since there is no cost to their doing so.
Finally, there exists a budgeting cost that induces the government to be indifferent between reallocating to point D and staying put at point C. This situation is shown in Panel D of Figure 3-1.
Regardless of its decision, the government will find itself on utility curve U’’. In Panel D, a reallocation of expenditures generates utility gains that are perfectly offset due to negotiation costs.
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3.2.2 Reliance on Earmarked Revenues
The other important factor in a government’s decision to re-allocate is the proportion of its budget
that come from highway-earmarked revenues 25 . The more dependent a government is on the
earmarked highway fund revenues, the rightward shift in budget constraints from S to S’ will be
greater in magnitude26. The government has more to gain by paying the cost of the negotiation and
shifting some of the revenues to other government purposes. Empirically, we would expect
governments more reliant on the highway revenues to reallocate a greater proportion of incoming
earmarked revenues than governments who are less reliant on the earmarked revenue source.
A government budget committee might choose to reallocate funds if that reallocation leaves the
municipality better off. Formulated in terms of consumer theory and in reference to Figure 3-1,
consider a budget committee with Cobb-Douglas preferences, 𝑈(𝐻, 𝐺) = 𝐻 𝑎 𝐺 1−𝑎 , with quantities
of highway (H) and general government services (G), respectively. The budget constraint is 𝑀 =
𝑃𝐻 𝐻 + 𝑃𝐺 𝐺, where M is total revenue. 𝑃𝐺 and 𝑃𝐻 are the relative prices of these goods and they
are set to parity. To distinguish general revenue from highway-earmarked revenue, use subscripts
so that 𝑀 = 𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ .
In scenario D, where the committee pays a fixed negotiation price27, L, to optimize its consumption
bundles, the quantity demanded of highways and general government goods and services can be
inferred from the Cobb-Douglas solutions as:
𝐻𝐷∗ = 𝑎(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿) and 𝐺𝐷∗ = (1 − 𝑎)(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿)

25

There is a parallel literature in consumer theory that suggests that the same income, received in different ways,
affects spending behavior. See (Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997).
26
Technically speaking, general income must also fall to keep total revenues constant.
27

Again, this cost could be interpreted as Legislative bargaining costs including costs to the committee members to attend meetings, gather
information, and carry out the necessary administrative procedures to reallocate the funding.
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In scenario C, where the committee must spend its earmarked revenues on highways, the quantity
demanded of H and G is:
𝐻𝐶 = 𝑎(𝑀𝑔 ) + 𝑀ℎ

and

𝐺𝐶 = (1 − 𝑎)𝑀𝑔

The committee will select point D over point C if:
𝑈(𝐻𝐷∗ , 𝐺𝐷∗ ) > 𝑈(𝐻𝐶 , 𝐺𝐶 )
Another way of phrasing this would be that the committee elects to pay L if the above conditions
hold. Substituting the quantities demanded above into the utility functions, the condition becomes:
(𝑎(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿))𝑎 ((1 − 𝑎)(𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ − 𝐿))1−𝑎

>

(𝑎𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ )𝑎 ((1 − 𝑎)𝑀𝑔 )1−𝑎

Solving for L reveals that the committee will pay L to reallocate28 their spending if the cost is less
than some quantity:

𝐿 < (𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ ) −

(√𝑀𝑔 )(√𝑎𝑀𝑔 + 𝑀ℎ )𝑎
(√𝑎)𝑎

The first term in parenthesis on the right hand side is the total revenue. Call the second term on
the right hand side 𝜌. To better understand the 𝜌 term, normalize the total municipal revenue so
that 𝑚𝑔 + 𝑚ℎ = 1 , where 𝑚𝑔 and 𝑚ℎ are the shares of revenues from general sources and
highway earmarks. 𝑙 is the negotiation cost as a share of total revenues. This implies that 𝑚𝑔 =
1 − 𝑚ℎ , and the above equation can be re-written as:

𝑙 < 1−

(√1 − 𝑚ℎ )(√𝑎 + 𝑚ℎ − 𝑎𝑚ℎ )𝑎
(√𝑎)𝑎

28

Take logs of both sides. The (1-a) terms cancel out. Log terms containing L can be combined. Isolate the L by raising that term to e and
cancelling.
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This reveals that the decision of the budget committee to switch from position C to position D in
Figure 3-1 is based on the budget reallocation costs (L), the share of the revenues from earmarked
funds (𝑚ℎ ), and the preference parameter (a) for highway consumption. An alternative form of
this statement is
𝑙 < 1 − 𝜌(𝑎, 𝑚ℎ )
There is no closed-form solution to 𝜌(𝑎, 𝑚ℎ ), but we do know that the Cobb-Douglas preference
parameter lies in the range 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1. So does the share of revenues from highway earmarks, so
0 ≤ 𝑚ℎ ≤ 1. Plotting 𝜌 as a function of 𝑚ℎ and for different given values of a, Figure 3-2 shows
that 𝜌(𝑎, 𝑚ℎ ) can be approximated by 𝜌(𝑚ℎ ) for any given value of a.
Figure 3-2 shows 𝜌(0.1, 𝑚ℎ ) with a dashed concave curve and 𝜌(0.5, 𝑚ℎ ) with a solid concave
curve. The solid line drawn directly from (0,1) to (1,0) is shown for reference. 𝜌 is insensitive to
movements in a that we can approximate the decision equation with:
𝑙 < 1 − 𝜌(𝑚ℎ )
Importantly, Figure 3-2 shows that 𝜌 varies between 0 and 1 for the relevant domains of 𝑚ℎ and
a. The share of revenues from earmarked highway sources is related to the value of 𝜌. 𝜌 falls as
𝑚ℎ rises, indicating that the whole right hand side of the decision equation gets larger as 𝑚ℎ rises.
A larger right hand side makes it more likely that the budget committee will elect to reallocate the
earmarked funds. Additionally, a larger (smaller) left hand side, 𝑙, will make it less (more) likely
for a committee to reallocate funds. This was the relationship that we illustrated with the charts in
Figure 3-1.

85

It is also informative to consider what would happen at extreme values. If the re-allocation cost,
L, were to go to zero, then the committee would be certain to optimize and it would end up at point
B in Figure 3-1, which is the traditional view of general transfers. If the re-allocation cost were 1,
then budget committees would always stay at point C. If 𝑚ℎ were zero, then the budget committee
would never re-allocate, and if 𝑚ℎ were 1, then the budget committee would always re-allocate.
These values fit well with the above theory and general intuition.

3.3 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
County governments in Oklahoma receive a significant portion of their revenues through an
earmarked Highway Fund, administered by the state. The relative importance of the Highway Fund
in each county’s budget varies markedly both across counties and over time. In terms of the model
presented above, Oklahoma county governments face different potential gains from reallocating
part of their Highway Fund to non-highway uses. In the graphical language of Figure 3-1, counties
experience different amount of rightward shift in their budget constraints due to influxes to the
Highway Fund. The budget process of each Oklahoma county government is regulated by the
County Budget Act of 1981, which prescribes a list of procedures that each county must follow to
adopt a legal annual budget 29 . The budget act provides substantial homogeneity in budgeting
procedures, although there is some allowance in the budget act for the counties to establish their
own conventions for the conduct of individual meetings. Given this budgeting environment,
budgeting costs are assumed to be relatively fixed for each municipality across time. To the extent
that they do change over time, due to adoption of computers for example, these changes are
assumed to be available to all counties at the same time. Using an empirical strategy where fixed

29

Oklahoma Statute (OS) §19-1401. (State of Oklahoma, 2015)
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effects control for budgeting costs, this section uses the Oklahoma county data to test the
hypothesis that higher levels of dependence on earmarked revenues will lead to greater reallocation
away from highway funds and to other general expenditures.
3.3.1 Activities, Expenditures, and Revenues of Oklahoma Counties
Oklahoma adopted its constitution and was admitted to the Union in 1907. The constitution
delineates the boundaries of 75 counties. Harmon County was created from Greer County in 1909,
and Cotton County was carved out of Comanche County in 1912 (State of Oklahoma, 1907).
Oklahoma has neither created nor merged counties since 1912, which makes for a set total of 77
counties throughout the study period of 1973 to 2012. In addition to counties, local governments
in Oklahoma include towns, cities, and special districts.
Oklahoma Counties perform a wide range of functions because they are the primary local
government in unincorporated lands. They are responsible for maintaining the peace and property
by fielding a sheriff and administering a county court system. Counties build and maintain roads
and other transportation infrastructure. They are responsible for public record keeping regarding
property and marriage, and even public welfare for “inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity,
or misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of the county (State of Oklahoma
Constitution, Title XVII-3).” A look at the average expenditure shares shows that while the
counties do indeed spend money on all these functions, they spend a large share of their budgets
on the construction and maintenance of highways.
The counties receive, on average, approximately 40% of their revenue from intergovernmental aid.
Nearly 30% of their revenue is from intergovernmental aid through the county highway fund. The
other 60% are own-source revenues, which are evenly split between property taxes, other taxes
(e.g. sales), and miscellaneous charges and revenue sources.
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3.3.2 Budgetary and Earmarking Rules for Oklahoma Counties
The Oklahoma County Budget Act establishes the institutional framework for the budgeting in
each county. Each county has a “county budget board,” which is chaired by the chairman of the
board of county commissioners. The members include all elected county officials, who each have
one vote 30 . At the beginning of a budget cycle, the county budget board requests estimated
revenues and expenditures from each county department or office31. It then prepares a budget that
is published at least 30 days prior to the beginning of a new fiscal year32. Each departmental officer
has the right to be heard by the county budget board before the final draft budget is published. Any
transfer of money between Funds is required to be “shown as a transfer from the one fund and as
a transfer to the other fund33.”
The budget board must hold a public hearing on the budget no less than 15 days prior to the
beginning of the new fiscal year. Any person may “present comments, recommendations, or
information on any part of the proposed budget” at the hearing34. The adopted budget is to be
examined and approved by the county excise board, who then “shall compute the appropriations
and levy the taxes necessary for the county for the budget year in accordance with this act. 35” Any
taxpayer may file a protest against illegality in the budget within 15 days of the county filing its
budget with the State Auditor and inspector36.
These budgeting procedures describe a lengthy and bureaucratic (and democratic) process where
there is significant labor cost involved in allocating public money. Re-allocation of earmarked

30

OS §19-1407.
OS §19-1411.
32
OS §19-1410.
33
OS §19-1410.
34
OS §19-1412.
35
OS §19-1414.
36
OS §19-1415.
31
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funds is flagged by the budgeting procedures as an activity that must be negotiated, documented
and subject to public review. In short, there is clear evidence that budget committees bear
significant time costs and incur additional scrutiny from re-allocating funds away from earmarked
categories. It is also clear that they have the authority to make reallocation decisions, so the cost
of doing so is not infinite.
3.3.3 The County Highway Fund and its Components
The highway fund is an indispensable source of revenues for some counties. Figure 3-5 shows how
the importance of the fund (as a percent of the total revenues) varies across counties and across
time. Counties are ordered across the horizontal axis based on their median reliance value. The
“reliance value” is on the vertical axis, with some counties counting on the highway fund as less
than 5% of their total revenue (on the left), and some counties rely on revenues from the highway
fund for over 60% of their revenues. The boxplots show the distribution, from 1973 to 2014 for
each county. The median value is the horizontal line in the middle of each box, with the 25th and
75th percentiles determining the bottom and top of the box, respectively. Outlier observations are
noted as points.
There is substantial variation within each county over time. Variation on this dimension is
particularly important for the empirical analysis discussed below, since county fixed effects cause
us to compare a given county to itself over time. It is not unusual for counties to experience an
interquartile range of 10 percentage points over the study period, and the importance of highway
funds for some counties is highly variable reaching an interquartile range of 40 percentage points.
I provide additional evidence that the fixed effects are enough to provide identification on the
parameter of interest through a robustness check, which uses components of the highway fund to
instrument for the full fund. The county highway fund receives money from three primary sources:
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Vehicle Taxes and Licenses, Motor Fuel Taxes, and the Gross Production Taxes (GPT). In fiscal
year 2014, the total distributions to the county highway funds equaled $291 million dollars. $126
million was from Fuel Tax. $76 million was from the Gross Production Tax, and $89 million was
from motor vehicle licenses. Figure 3-6 shows how these proportions have varied over time. The
motor fuel tax has gradually become less important, and the motor vehicle tax has become
increasingly important. The Gross Production Tax played a larger role in the early 1980s and mid
2000s when the prices of oil or natural gas were relatively high.
The State of Oklahoma levies a severance tax as an ad-valorem charge on the gross market value
of Oil37, Gas, and Mineral production38. The Gross Production Tax has typically been set at 7% of
the gross value of oil and gas, though there are provisions in the law to reduce the percentages in
the case that price of oil falls below $17 per barrel or gas below $2.10 per thousand cubic feet
(mcf)39. Of these receipts, approximately 7% are apportioned to the county highway fund. These
distributions appear as the GPT component of the highway fund in Figure 3-6. The funds are
distributed so that, “Each county shall receive a proportionate share of the funds available based
upon the proportion of the total value of production from such county in the corresponding month
of the preceding year40.” The annual lag in payments means that county authorities are able to
calculate with a high level of certainty the amount of GPT money that will be available to their
highway fund in an upcoming fiscal year.

37

“there is hereby levied upon the production of oil a tax as set forth in this subsection on the gross value of the
production of oil based on a per barrel measurement of forty-two (42) U.S. gallons of two hundred thirty-one (231)
cubic inches per gallon, computed at a temperature of sixty (60) degrees Fahrenheit.” OS §68-1001.
38
OS §68-1004.
39
OS §68-1001.
40
OS §68-1004.
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The county highway fund receives substantial contribution from the gross production tax in
counties that are endowed with natural resource production. The GPT is levied on petroleum and
natural gas production. Figure 3-7 shows that the counties who are large oil producers are not
necessarily important natural gas producers, and vice-versa. It also shows that the GPT is an
important part of many county’s budgets, which is relevant because this provides variation in the
extent to which a county’s budget is composed of highway revenues. The importance of the GPT
in county budgets varies significantly by county and over time. The right column in Figure 3-7
shows how GPT played an important role in county budgets in 1980s, its effects waned in the
1990s and then it picked up again in the 2000s. The revenues in the 1980s were due to petroleum,
while the revenues in the 2000s are due to natural-gas production. Note that because of the
distinction between petroleum and natural gas, petroleum-rich/natural gas-poor counties for whom
the GPT was an important revenue source in the 1970 never saw their revenue shares rebound in
the 2000s. Together, these trends across time and across counties provide important underlying
variation in the extent to which counties rely on the highway fund for their revenue base.
3.3.4 The Model
Highway spending in Oklahoma counties is a function of the revenues, population, and
geographical extent of a county. The theory discussed above and the literature on earmarking
suggests that Oklahoma counties might treat revenue arriving through the Highway Fund as
different from general revenues, which requires that general revenues and highway revenues be
included separately in the model. This paper proposes a theory whereby counties that are more
reliant on earmarked highway funds for their total revenues will be more likely to transfer money
away from highway spending, given fixed negotiation costs. That suggests the effect of the
highway-fund revenues is conditional on the volume of total revenues other than those from the
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highway fund. Population for county i in time t is included as a control variable, as is its square.
Fixed effects are included for counties and for years. The county fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖 , pick up the effect
of time-invariant factors such as the geographical extent of the county. The budgeting costs for
each county are assumed to be relatively time-invariant, so they are also absorbed into the county
fixed effect. To the extent that the budgeting costs might vary over time due to improvements in
technology or changes in regulations, it is assumed that they change uniformly across all counties.
The year fixed effect, 𝛿𝑡 , captures factors that change over time but are generally constant across
counties. For example, this would capture the effect that a particularly bad winter in any given
year has on necessary highway maintenance expenditures. It would also control for statewide
factors that change over time and affect budgeting costs, such as the adoption of computers.
HwyExpit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Revit + 𝛽2 HwyFundit + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it 𝜶1,2 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it
HwyExpit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Revit + 𝛽2 HwyFundit + 𝛽3 (

HwyFundit
Revit

) + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it 𝜶1,2 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it

(1)
(2)

Highway expenditures and all revenues are measured in Thousands of USD (2010 real value), so
the coefficients represent dollar changes in highway spending for a dollar change in revenues. This
model is estimated with and without the highway reliance term. When it is estimated without
highway reliance term, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽2 , which describes the dollar change in
highway spending for a dollar change in highway funds, holding revenues constant. It should be
positive, between zero and one, since it indicates the share of highway funds that are spent on
highways. When the highway reliance term is added to the model, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽3.
It estimates the extent to which a higher reliance on highway funds, as part of the total budget,
affects total highway spending (holding revenues and earmarked funds constant). The theoretical
prediction is that counties that are more reliant on earmarked funds will be more likely to re92

allocate these funds away from highway expenditures, so we expect to estimate a negative
coefficient for 𝛽3.
An additional variation is estimated for models (1) and (2), where the effect of the highway fund
is conditional on the population of the county. Each model is also estimated by including an
interaction term between the highway fund size and population. One might imagine a scenario
where additional highway fund revenue is appropriated differently depending on whether a county
has a larger or smaller population. This model is estimated as:
HwyFundit
HwyExpit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Revit + 𝛽2 HwyFundit + 𝛽3 (
)
Revit
+𝛽4 (HwyFundit ∗ Popit ) + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it 𝜶1,2 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it

(2b)

3.3.5 Data
The primary sources of data are the US Census Bureau’s Historical Finances of Individual
Governments (IndFin) and the Oklahoma Tax Commissions records on county highway fund
distributions. IndFin contains revenue and expenditure data for detailed accounts for 1967 and
from 1972 to 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). The county highway fund distributions are
available for 1973 to 2014 (Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2014) . The common overlapping time
period between the two data sources is 40 years, from 1973 to 2012. Accordingly, all models are
estimated for all 77 counties over the course of 40 years from 1973 to 2012. This period captures
significant temporal variation in highway funding and spending.
Not every county appears in every year due to the nature of the data collection procedures at the
US Census Bureau’s Individual Government Finances (IndFin) dataset. Figure 3-8 shows the
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availability of these data with Oklahoma’s 77 counties arranged alphabetically in columns, and
years in rows. Shaded cells indicate data availability for a county-year.
All 77 counties appear in the dataset on five year intervals for years ending in 2 and 7 since the
US Census of Governments was adminstered during these “benchmark” years. The US Census
bureau carries out the “Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances” between the
benchmark years.

The Bureau says that it randomly selects a sample of state and local

governments every five years (in years ending in 4 and 9)41. However, it is apparent from Figure
3-8 that some counties always find themselves in the random sample for non-benchmark years,
which suggests that the random sampling may be conditional on specific factors. Counties that are
consistently included are overwhelmingly the highest populated counties (over 60,000 inhabitants)
in the state. Random sampling stratified on population would be unlikely to bias our estimates
since population appears as a control in the model for this paper. Nevertheless, an additional model
(#3) is estimated for only benchmark years (ending in 2 and 7) to check whether sampling bias has
been addressed.
3.3.6 Results
The results from equations 1, 2 and 3 are presented in Table 3.3. Additionally, the estimates for
each model are shown for versions a and b, where model b adds an interaction term for highway
revenues and population. Version a is the model without the Highway Revenue reliance term
(HRev/TRev). This serves to facilitate comparison with estimates that disregard this factor.
Models 1 and 2 are full sample estimates, while model 3 is the restricted sample estimate, using
only benchmark census of government years.

41

https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/go0400.html
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The estimates from model one indicate that, on average, county highway spending rises 55 or 68
cents for every dollar of earmarked highway revenues.

While these point estimates are

meaningfully higher than 0.37, which is the average rate at which counties spent their money on
highways in 2012, only 1b comes close to being statistically significantly higher at a 95%
confidence level. So the evidence for a crowding out effect, whereby a disproportionately large
portion of the highway fund revenues are being directed into highway spending, is suggestive but
not definitive. It could be that the overall crowdout effect is weak, or it could be that the crowdout
depends on some additional heterogeneity not included in this model. In that case, the average
crowdout effect is weak, but this is deceptive since it is strong for some counties and weak for
others. The theory described above suggests that the additional factor is the reliance of counties
on earmarked highway funds for their total budgets.
Models 2a and 2b add the highway revenue reliance term (HRev/TRev) to control for the additional
heterogeneity indicated in the theory section. The reliance term has a statistically significant
effect42 in the expected direction. Recall that the hypothesis is that a higher reliance ratio would
lead to greater re-allocations away from highway spending. Thus, the expected effect on highway
spending should be negative. The direction of the reliance effect remains negative and roughly
similar in magnitude for models 2a and 2b. Taking model 2b as a preferred model since it
incorporates both the highway revenue reliance term and an additional control, the magnitude of
𝛽3 in equation 2b is $28,000 dollars less spending for a 1 percentage point increase in reliance on
highways funds43. This suggests that a county with a reliance ratio of 0.5 would spend $1.4 million
less on highways than a similarly situated county with all its budget coming from general funds (a

42
43

The t-statistic on the reliance ratio term in model 2a is significant at p=0.054.
All values are expressed in 2010 real prices.
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reliance ratio of zero). Considering that the median county in Oklahoma spent $4.2 million per
year on highways in 2012, this would represent a significant proportion of the budget that was
transferred out of the highway fund into other uses.
The estimates in model 3 show that we reach the same conclusion even when using the restricted
sample. The estimates from model 3 represent a reduction of $30,000 to $36,000 per additional
percentage point of reliance on highway funding. So the estimates are close to that of model 2b.
Any bias in the full sample is actually causing our estimates to be too low. The estimates from the
restricted sample strengthen the conclusion that reliance on earmarked funds, holding revenue
constant, is associated with lower highway spending.
The marginal effect of highway funds on highway spending in models 2a and 3a show that the
displacement effect is conditional on revenue reliance and population. In other words, there is
not just one crowdout effect. Rather, the magnitude of the transfer of funds out of highway
spending depends on several factors. Overall, Table 3.3 gives strong evidence that highways
who receive a greater proportion of their revenues as highway funding transfer more money out
of their highway spending account, which is consistent with the hypotheses that emerge from the
theory.
3.3.7 Robustness Check
An important concern with early empirical work on crowd-out effects was that external aid was
endogenously determined by a recipient’s preferences (Knight, 2002). Under these circumstances,
it would look like communities spend 100% of the earmarked money on the earmarked category
because that was what they were intending to spend the money on all along. One potential source
of omitted variable bias could be that HighwayExpenditures could be correlated with
HighwayFunds through each county’s response to oil or natural gas prices. For example, higher
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oil prices might increase the size of the highway fund due to higher fuel taxes, and also increase
operating expenses of highway construction and maintenance. To address this concern, an
additional model is estimated that instruments the highway fund with a component of the fund that
varies in an essentially random way. A county’s gross production tax (GPT) revenues are
determined by a county’s reserves and production of oil, natural gas, and minerals, and by the
prevailing market prices of those commodities. Evidence is presented below that shows gross
production tax revenues are conditionally uncorrelated with fuel-tax revenues, and that GPT
revenues also have a strong first-stage correlation with highway fund, since the GPT is an
important component of the fund44. The first stage of the 2SLS model is:
HwyFundit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 Revit + 𝛼2 GPTit + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it 𝜶3,4 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢it

(R1)

The second stage is estimated with:
^

^

HwyExpit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Revit + 𝛽2 HwyFundit + 𝛽3 (

HwyFundit
Revit

) + 𝐏𝐨𝐩it 𝜷4,5 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖it (R2)

3.3.7.1 Evidence for Validity of the Instrument for Highway Funds
The estimates in the instrumented model are consistent with those of the non-instrumented model
for the coefficients of interest. Due to concerns that the size of the Highway Fund might be
associated with energy price fluctuations that would also affect highway spending, an instrumental
variables strategy is used. The instrument chosen is a component of the highway fund that is

44

The instrumented variable also appears in the fractional term. For now, I have performed a manual 2SLS where I
estimate the first stage using all exogenous variables that also appear in the second stage plus the instrument, and
then I predict a value for highway funding. That predicted value is then used in the second stage by itself and part
of the fractional term. This means that the standard errors are not corrected for 2SLS.
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thought to be vary in an essentially random way with the extent to which fuel prices affect a county.
A good measure are the fuel tax revenues, which are an important component of the highway fund.
Table 3.4 shows the results from a regression of the FuelTax on GPT and the other first stage
covariates. The estimated (conditional) covariation between GPT and FuelTax is statistically
insignificant with over 2000 observations and it is also practically near zero. This gives some
confidence that the instrument is conditionally uncorrelated with the most obvious potential
omitted variable.
The first stage of the 2SLS estimates is shown in Table 3.5. GPT is highly correlated with
HwyFund, which is expected since a portion of the money earned through the gross production tax
is legally obligated to be placed into the county highway fund. The fact that GPT is correlated with
HwyFund, but it is not conditionally correlated with the most obvious source of omitted variable
bias strengthens the case of the instrument.
3.3.7.2 IV Estimates
The instrument, however, turns out to not materially affect the above conclusions in that the
direction and magnitude of the coefficients on the reliance ratio remain roughly similar, and also
remains statistically significant. Table 3.6 compares equation 2 with and without instrumenting
for highway funds. The effect for a 1 pp change in the reliance ratio is in the neighborhood of
$25,000 USD. Additionally, the third column in Table 3.6 shows that the change in highway
spending without the ratio variable in the model is approximately 0.7 cents per dollar. Again,
this is well above the 0.37 average highway spending and thus suggestive that a flypaper effect is
operating for earmarked highway revenues. Most importantly, the instrumented estimates
provide additional evidence that a county’s overall reliance on highway funds leads to lower
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highway expenditures, all else equal. In other words, there is reason to believe that the crowdout effect is conditional on the reliance ratio.

3.4 CONCLUSION
Academic literature often asks whether governments actually comply with their own earmarking
laws. Empirical literature finds that they typically do, contrary to what would typically be expected
of an optimizing budget authority. I propose a theory whereby a costly budgeting procedure can
provide friction that accounts for at least some of the contradiction between theory and experience.
If budget transaction costs are zero, then the normal view of earmarks prevails in that expenditures
should grow in line with the marginal propensity to consume from new income. Alternatively, a
perfect absence of crowding-out is obtained by assuming reallocation costs are infinite. I present
results that indicate evidence is in line with the theory.
I also show that the amount of money diverted from earmarked funds is related to the share those
funds make up of total revenues. Given that governments face different negotiation costs and
different potential gains from reallocating funds, it stands to reason that there is not just one
crowding-out effect. Rather, it varies based on the costs and benefits that communities face from
the reallocations. I find that the typically large spending effect of earmarked revenues is greatly
mitigated by a county’s reliance on those revenues as a share of its overall budget.
The implications of this theory are practically important because it implies that the ability of
earmarks to stimulate specific expenditures will be effective at low levels, but lose force as they
become a larger portion of a budget authority’s total revenues. In a world where earmarked taxes
are suggested left and right by politicians, it is useful to have theory and evidence that they work
well in moderation, but that there is a limit to what they can achieve.
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3.5 FIGURES
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Figure 3-1: Decision to Reallocate Earmarked Funds given a Costly Budgeting Process
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Figure 3-2: Behavior of rho as a function of share of revenues from highway earmarks

Figure 3-3: Expenditure Shares in Oklahoma Counties, 2012
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Figure 3-4: Revenue Sources for Oklahoma Counties, 2012

Figure 3-5: Distribution of Highway Fund as Percentage of Total Revenue
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Figure 3-6: The Oklahoma County Highway Fund (Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2014)
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OIL & GAS PRODUCTION & RELIANCE
ON SEV TAX




Left Column: Production Values (in MM 2010
USD)
Right Column: Severance tax as a percent of total
county budget 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The scale is
the same over time, so a county changing from red
to orange means it fell below the 30% reliance
threshold.

OKLAHOMA SEVERANCE TAX AS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COUNTY
BUDGET (1980s)

Sources: Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Production), US
Census Bureau (GIS Shapefiles)

OKLAHOMA OIL PRODUCTION VALUE
BY COUNTY (1980s)

OKLAHOMA NATURAL GAS
PRODUCTION VALUE BY COUNTY
(1980s)

OKLAHOMA SEVERANCE TAX AS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COUNTY
BUDGET (1990s)

OKLAHOMA SEVERANCE TAX AS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COUNTY
BUDGET (2000s)

Figure 3-7: Oil and Gas Production and Reliance on Gross Production Tax Revenue
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Figure 3-8: IndFin Data Availability for Oklahoma Counties, 1973 - 2012
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3.6 TABLES
Expenditures in Oklahoma Counties, 2012 (Thousands)
n median mean
sd
min
77 22.12
48.72
107.37
2.48
Population
77 1141
1936.77 3280.67 89
Administration
65 396
1086.71 3758.93 30
Health
5 2190
5305.20 8088.63 3
Education Aid
75 4219
4959.25 3204.17 120
Highway
76 1291
3467.46 8739.65 3
Police &
Corrections
15 7241
25894.67 53318.27 3
Hospital
74 277.5
685.81
1876.95 43
Judicial
19 163
1914.37 4750.67 7
Interest on Debt
33 158
1003.64 3405.99 1
Public Buildings
75 2013
3726.41 9022.40 51
Other Spending

max
718.63
22997
30247
19370
17046
55717
205712
14978
17140
19646
70846

*Descriptive statistics are shown for counties that were observed to have non-zero expenditures in a given
category. The number of observations below 77 represents the number of counties that reported zero
expenditures on a given category in 2012.

Table 3.1: Expenditures in Oklahoma Counties, 2012

Revenue Sources for Oklahoma Counties, 2012 (Thousands)
n median mean
sd
min
77 22.12
48.72
107.37
2.475
Population
77 1931
5772.91 14169.15 152
Property Tax
74 2272
4226.38 11372.17 233
Other Taxes
75 3268
3644.93 2580.39 4
Highway Fund
76 980
2499.40 4796.06 39
Other IGR
76 1771
7537.68 24924
42
Charges and Misc
Rev
2 1604
1603.50 2212.54 39
Other Revenue
77 26.56
28.36
18.12
0
Hwy Rev Pct of Rev
77 747
1164.50 1142.94 156.38
GPT (Gross Prod
Tax)

max
718.63
94654
97885
13945
30651
200368
3168
61.43
5401.31

*Descriptive statistics are shown for counties that were observed to have non-zero revenues in a given category. The number
of observations below 77 represents the number of counties that reported zero revenues in a given category during 2012.

Table 3.2: Revenue Sources for Oklahoma Counties, 2012
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Oklahoma County Highway Spending, 1973 - 2012

General
Revenue
Highway Fund
Revenue
Population
Pop^2

Hwy
Spending
(1a)
0.025**

Hwy
Spending
(1b)
0.023**

Hwy Spending
(Benchmark)
(2a)
0.022**

Hwy
Spending
(2b)
0.018**

Hwy
Spending
(3a)
0.035***

Hwy Spending
(Benchmark)
(3b)
0.026**

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.012)

(0.011)

0.566***

0.683***

0.663***

0.822***

0.793***

0.923***

(0.175)

(0.178)

(0.212)

(0.218)

(0.178)

(0.173)

32.417***

36.739***

29.051***

33.174***

39.361***

41.626***

(8.547)

(7.895)

(9.198)

(8.165)

(10.325)

(9.613)

-0.067***

-0.048***

-0.062***

-0.039***

-0.055***

-0.027**

(0.009)

(0.01)

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.009)

(0.012)

-0.002***

HRev*Pop

-0.002***

(0)
HRev/TRev

Constant
N
r2

-0.002***

(0)

(0)

-22.728*

-28.429**

-30.382**

-36.441***

(11.568)

(11.464)

(12.498)

(12.179)

607.836

339.916

1343.698***

1220.316***

876.660**

924.073**

(502.614)

(507.447)

(336.635)

(328.375)

(422.153)

(408.332)

2110

2110

2110

2110

592

592

0.362

0.386

0.375

0.406

0.44

0.462

Cells Contain Coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors). All models have county and year fixed-effects. All revenue and
spending values are in 1000s of real USD (2010), and Population is 1000 residents.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.3: Oklahoma County Highway Spending, 1973 - 2012

Conditional Correlation of GPT with FuelTax
Coef.
Std. Err.
GPT
-0.009
0.0087
Rev
-0.001**
0.0005
Pop
11.17***
1.56
Pop*Pop
-0.0098*** 0.0016
Year and County FEs, Robust Ses, N=2103

Table 3.4: Conditional Correlation of GPT with FuelTax
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First Stage to estimate HwyFund
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.907***
0.108
GPT
-0.006
0.004
GRev
24.2***
3.2
Pop
-0.016
0.004
Pop*Pop
Year and County FEs, Robust Ses, N=2103

Table 3.5: First Stage in Estimate of HwyFund

Oklahoma County Highway Spending, 1973 - 2012, robustness check
Hwy Spending
Hwy
Hwy
Spending (IV) Spending (IV)
0.022**
0.021***
0.026***
General Revenue
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.009)
0.663***
0.844***
0.776***
Highway Fund Revenue
(0.212)
(0.09)
(0.1)
-22.728*
-25.141***
HRev/TRev
(11.568)
(4.149)
29.051***
21.312***
28.658***
Population
(9.198)
(7.585)
(8.114)
-0.062***
-0.055***
-0.064***
Pop^2
(0.011)
(0.01)
(0.009)
1343.698***
1170.350***
21.996
Constant
(336.635)
(438.944)
(423.004)
2110
2056
2056
N
0.375
0.318
0.264
r2
Cells Contain Coefficients and (Robust Standard Errors). All models have county and year fixed-effects.
All revenue and spending values are in 1000s of real USD (2010), and Population is 1000 residents.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.6: Oklahoma County Highway Spending, 1973 - 2012, robustness check

109

3.7 REFERENCES
Athanassakos, A. (1990). General fund financing versus earmarked taxes: An alternative model
of budgetary choice in a democracy. Public Choice, 66(3), 261–278.
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125778
Bös, D. (2000). Earmarked taxation: welfare versus political support. Journal of Public
Economics, 75(3), 439–462. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00075-4
Bradford, D. F., & Oates, W. E. (1971). Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental
Grants. The American Economic Review, 61(2), 440–448.
Brown, C. (2013). State Revenues and the Natural Gas Boom: An Assessment of State Oil and
Gas Production Taxes. NCSL. Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/staterevenues-and-the-natural-gas-boom.aspx
Buchanan, J. M. (1963). The Economics of Earmarked Taxes. Journal of Political Economy,
71(5), 457–469.
Fisher, R. C. (1982). Income and grant effects on local expenditure: The flypaper effect and
other difficulties. Journal of Urban Economics, 12(3), 324–345.
http://doi.org/10.1016/0094-1190(82)90021-3
Gamkhar, S. (2000). Is the Response of State and Local Highway Spending Symmetric to
Increases and Decreases in Federal Highway Grants? Public Finance Review, 28(1), 3–
25. http://doi.org/10.1177/109114210002800101
Gamkhar, S. (2003). The Role of Federal Budget and Trust Fund Institutions in Measuring the
Effect of Federal Highway Grants on State and Local Government Highway Expenditure.
Public Budgeting & Finance, 23(1), 1–21. http://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5850.2301001
Hines, J. R., Jr., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 217–226.
Knight, B. (2002). Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending:
Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program. The American Economic
Review, 92(1), 71–92.
Lundberg, S. J., Pollak, R. A., & Wales, T. J. (1997). Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their
Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit. The Journal of Human
Resources, 32(3), 463–480. http://doi.org/10.2307/146179
McCleary, W. (1991). The Earmarking of Government Revenue: A Review of Some World
Bank Experience. The World Bank Research Observer, 6(1), 81–104.
http://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/6.1.81

110

Nesbit, T. M., & Kreft, S. F. (2009). Federal Grants, Earmarked Revenues, and Budget CrowdOut: State Highway Funding. Public Budgeting & Finance, 29(2), 94–110.
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2009.00930.x
Oklahoma Tax Commission. (2014). Distribution of Taxes to Counties for Roads. Retrieved
from http://www.tax.ok.gov/reports4.html
State of Oklahoma. (1907). Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. Retrieved from
http://oklegal.onenet.net/okcon/
State of Oklahoma. Oklahoma Statutes, 19(1401), 68(1001) (2015).
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015). Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and
Census of Governments (1967,1970-2012).
Wilde, J. (1968). The Expenditure Effects of Grant-In-Aid Programs. National Tax Journal,
21(3), 340–348.

111

4 CHAPTER 4: ADOPTION OF OWN-SOURCE REVENUE IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: THE CASE OF A PUBLIC LIGHTING
TAX IN BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Local governments in many developing countries rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers for
their revenues (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2010;
Gervasoni, 2010). While there are good reasons for this practice45, academic research has
consistently found that own-source revenues drive a bevy of positive outcomes, including
restrained government spending, lower corruption, and better government responsiveness. In
many cases, local governments possess the authorization necessary to institute local taxes, so
increasing own-source revenues depends on their decision to exercise taxing authority. A natural
question then is, what factors might cause transfer-dependent governments to increase their own
fiscal effort?
This paper lays out three categories of explanation (revenue need, politics and policy diffusion)
and tests them against each other in the context of Brazil’s municipal light tax. Results indicate
that adoption of a local lighting tax was weakly associated with smaller revenues. The strength of
the opposition in the legislature and the adoption of the tax by neighbors were strongly
associated with the probability of adoption. I interpret these results as evidence that many of
Brazil’s municipal governments are open to taxing their residents if they are suffering revenue
shortfall. However, political considerations play a significant role in own-source tax adoption.

45

The two most common justifications are a lack of revenue collection capacity at the local level, and the need to
provide for financial transfers to indigent communities.
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4.2 LITERATURE
Own-source revenues are fiscal resources that a government collects from its residents in the
form of taxation. Other major funding sources for governments include income from returns on
owned assets (e.g. natural resource ownership) or through external aid. The distinction between
these revenue types arises repeatedly in academic literature, and the general consensus is that
own-source revenues are associated with greater economic efficiency and better governance
outcomes.
4.2.1 The Benefits of Own-Source Revenue
This argument has a long and noble lineage, including in grand works that argue representation
in the modern democratic state is the result of taxation (Huntington, 1993) (Bates & Lien, 1985;
Huntington, 1993; Musgrave, 1992; Tilly, 1985). The theory, which draws heavily on European
history, views government as a ruler or group of elites trying to maximize their wealth and glory.
Where political leadership faces tight budget conditions and must tax its subjects, it will be
forced to bargain with society. In exchange for tax revenues, leaders relinquish some control of
decision-making institutions. Ross provides the first contemporary, cross-country econometric
treatment of this theory and concludes that holding revenues constant, taxation without
commensurate public service benefits is often followed by more democratic institutions within a
few years (Ross, 2004). Using the case of Argentina, Gervasoni shows that this logic may also
be applied to sub-national governments (Gervasoni, 2010).
Governments that receive non-tax revenues (e.g. from natural resource proceeds or through
governmental aid46) find themselves in a position where they are able to provide public services

46

See (Beblawi, 1987) and (Moore, 2004) for a discussion of natural-resource vs. territorial rents.
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through minimal taxation of their citizens. Political accountability can subsequently deteriorate
because the government is less dependent on its local residents for its revenues47. Empirical
studies have pointed to many cases where governments with significant non-own-source
revenues are more corrupt and supply inferior public goods, compared to what they would
provide with comparable own-source revenues48.
While studies continually find a robust connection between own-source revenues and better
governance outcomes, the mechanisms by which this happens have not been settled. One set of
explanations focuses on the incentives facing the ruling elite. Since governments with non-ownsource revenues are typically larger49 and more corrupt than governments funded out of ownsource revenue, it is more valuable to hold power. This naturally requires the ruler to spend
heavily on maintaining his position, which leads to more patronage, prevention of social group
formation and repression50. Expenditures on these activities, at the very least, represent good
money being diverted from public services. A more serious risk is that the diverted public
monies are used to fund activities that undermine government institutions. Other scholars have
hypothesized that poor service quality comes about because outside revenue is more difficult for
citizens to track, especially where it fluctuates substantially from year to year. Unless the
municipality is fastidious in its bookkeeping, political leadership has more latitude to

47

The theoretical literature on the political aspects of the natural resource curse can be found in (Beblawi, 1987;
Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 1999, 2001, 2013; Van der Ploeg, 2011). See in (Easterly, 2008) for a discussion of similar
effects of international aid, and see (Gervasoni, 2010) for similar outcomes resulting from intergovernmental aid.
48
(Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2010) and (Gadenne, 2012) offer evidence that larger transfers lead to
corruption in Brazilian municipalities. (Fisman & Gatti, 2002) find larger transfers are associated with more
corruption in US States. (Gadenne, 2012) shows that increases in own-source revenues in Brazil are more likely to
be spent on education and health infrastructure than on administration.
49
See the “flypaper effect” literature. See (Hines & Thaler, 1995) for a review, and (Remmer, 2004).
See (Ross, 2001) for a list of “supply side” factors at the national level, and (Gervasoni, 2010) for a discussion of
how the supply-side explanation operates at a sub-national level.
50
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misappropriate public funds because citizens do not have a sense of how much money is in the
coffers51. Finally, a surfeit of non-tax revenues means that rulers can avoid the need to bargain
with, and make concessions to, representatives of various social groups.
Recent literature has increasingly focused on how citizens regard own-source revenues
differently than outside public funds. In order to demand government fiscal efficiency, citizens
require four conditions. They need information about the budget; they need an interest and
ability to evaluate the budget; they need an interest and ability to mobilize for changes in the
budget; and they need the ability to monitor and punish deviations from budget execution. This
appears to be asking a lot, since citizens must overcome a collective action problem to make
progress on demanding information, mobilizing against unjust budget arrangements, and
investigating budget execution. However, angry taxpayers have been historically adept at
sparking enough grievance and mobilization to overcome the collective action problem. In fact,
recent research gives evidence to confirm that the “angry taxpayer” is an important factor in
pressuring the government for better public services. (Broms, 2014) shows that there is a
relationship between taxpaying and political interest at the individual level. (Paler, 2013) finds in
a field experiment that people who go through the motions of taxation are more likely to want to
monitor the governments budgets, and (Martin, 2014) finds that group members are more likely
to monitor and sanction group leaders where group resources are procured by direct taxation.
The psychological mechanism by which this appears to happen is through loss-aversion52. In the
context of public revenues, loss aversion means that the reduction in wellbeing that citizens

51

This transparency argument is discussed in (Ross, 2013) and (Humphreys, 2005). It is also the mechanism that is
assumed by (Gadenne, 2012).
52
See (Hines & Thaler, 1995) for loss-aversion and the flypaper effect, and (Martin, 2014) for experimental research
into how loss-aversion increases civic engagement (monitoring and sanctioning) of citizens in Uganda.
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experience when they face curtailment of an existing public service is larger than the loss they
feel when an expected equal increase in public service fails to materialize. Practically, this
means that citizens will fight tooth-and-nail to defend small existing public services, but they
may fail to organize and press for large beneficial changes. Lucy Martin tells a vivid story about
how Ugandans poured fish refuse on the city hall when their trash collection stopped. However,
despite heavy media coverage, there was little public protest when corruption in the Ugandan
government put hundreds of millions of potential international aid dollars in jeopardy (Martin,
2014).
It is unlikely that all forms of taxation have the same effect on citizen monitoring. Intrusive and
conspicuous taxes destined for local government probably generate more political interest than
hidden taxes directed to a central government. The intrusiveness of a tax is measured by the
amount of time and money that a taxpayer must spend. Property tax is intrusive because it
requires a taxpayer to sit down and write a large check to her government. Income tax is
intrusive due to its size, and also because of the administrative time it requires. However,
income taxes are generally destined for a distant central or state government, where the taxpayer
knows she has minimal influence. Sales taxes on day to day purchases, although transparent on
the goods receipt, are less intrusive because of their relatively small influence on buying
decisions. Excise taxes are the least intrusive, since they are built into the advertised price of a
product and the consumer cannot easily know what shares of their expenditure goes to the
government and to the supplier.
4.2.2 Endogenous Adoption of Own-Source Revenue
Own-source revenues likely play a role in good government as the literature suggests, but it is an
uphill battle for politicians to adopt them. The revenue’s conspicuousness, the very feature that
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also makes it beneficial, makes its adoption politically difficult. For local public officials, it is
politically advantageous to leave the difficult work of tax collection to the central government.
As soon as a local government steps up and begins to collect intrusive taxes, it accepts a large
political liability in that it must demonstrate that the money was well spent. Shrewd local
politicians will want to avoid this scenario, so there is natural reticence for local governments to
institute direct taxation when they can avoid it.
Central and state governments can push local governments to increase their fiscal effort, but the
local authorities must ultimately choose to adopt the additional taxes. Federal reforms that
unilaterally shift tax collection responsibility to the local level may run into problems if the local
government refuses or is unable to collect revenues53. Thus, it is useful to understand what
factors make municipalities more likely to undertake own-source revenue collections if the goal
of policy is to push them in that direction. There are few examples of research that examines the
factors that make adoption of own-source fiscal effort more likely54, and even fewer in the
context of developing countries. This paper aims to make progress on the broader question of
own-source tax adoption by way of examining the case of a local lighting tax in Brazilian
municipalities.

53

Fiscal devolution without capable local tax collectors happened in Senegal, and it led to serious deterioration of
local government services (Juul, 2006).
54
(Sjoquist, Smith, Walker, & Wallace, 2007) investigates “time to adoption of local sales tax” in Georgia, USA, and
(Gadenne, 2012) includes a selection model into a tax improvement program as part of her paper.
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4.3 BACKGROUND
4.3.1 The Case of the Brazilian Municipal Public Light Tax
Brazilian municipalities depend heavily on transfer revenues from the Federal and state
governments. A typical municipality receives 95% of its fiscal resources in the form of
intergovernmental aid (Brazil National Treasury, 2013). Nevertheless, there are opportunities for
a Brazilian municipality keen on adopting own-source revenue. Local legislatures can choose to
impose a service tax (ISS) on local businesses. They may also adopt property taxes on urban and
rural lands. The federal government has worked hard to encourage adoption of urban property
taxes in recent years, though property taxes are a major source of revenue for only the largest
municipalities. Taxation of rural property is rare, and even then it must be shared with the
federal government. There is an important distinction in Brazilian tax law between taxes and
contributions. While local taxes may be appropriated for any use, local governments are also
permitted to adopt “contributions.” Contributions are akin to user-fees in the sense that they are
targeted at users of a specific public service and their revenues are earmarked for the service in
question.
The public lighting contribution, also known as the Contribution to the Cost of Public Lighting
(COSIP) was formally adopted by a constitutional amendment in December of 2002 (EC #39).
Some municipalities had previously used a public lighting tax but critics challenged its
constitutionality and won in the Supreme Court. The tax was re-authorized as an earmarked
“contribution” and the COSIP amendment allowed municipalities to charge a lighting fee,
designed by the city, on residents. Many municipalities that had previously been reluctant to
adopt the lighting tax due to its doubtful legality were swift to approve the lighting contribution
following the 2002 legislation. Figure 4-1 shows the percent of municipalities that charged some
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kind of a light tax in 2002 and how that rate rose over the next ten years. Adoption was
particularly swift in the four years following the amendment. The general trend was that
approximately 50% of the municipalities used a light tax at the time the legislation was passed in
2002. By 2012, nearly 80% of the municipalities received revenues from a COSIP lighting
contribution.
The proceeds from COSIP are formally earmarked for public lighting, and while the tax burden
varies by municipality, a rough estimate is that it typically increases the light bill by 10% 55. The
Brazilian media regularly highlights the high cost of electricity, so an additional tax of 10% is a
clearly unpopular policy choice that will draw attention. Nevertheless, public lighting, the
service that citizens supposedly receive for this payment, is visible and valued. Thus the choice
of adopting this tax is something that mayors and councilors are likely to weigh carefully
because of its political salience.
COSIP is an especially expedient tax to study for the purpose of research into own-source
revenue adoption due to its low administrative burden. Politicians considering whether to adopt
the contribution need not concern themselves with the administrative costs or required
investment to collect because these factors are negligible. The electric distributor places an advalorem or specific surcharge on light bills, depending on the design of the contribution. The
distributor then transfers the tax revenues to the municipality throughout the year. As such, the
tax is easy to calculate and piggybacks on a billing system that is already operational and
effective.

55

For example, the tax in the São Paulo Capital is approximately R$ 4 per month. On a home that uses 200 kWh per
month at the standard rate of R$ 0.26 per kWh and pays R$ 56 per month for electricity, that represents a tax of 7%.
In Rio de Janeiro, the tax is R$ 8.71 per month for COSIP and the electricity tariff of R$ 0.38 per kWh. Effectively,
the same household is paying a tax of 11% on their light account. In RJ, the tax varies with consumption level.
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COSIP offers Brazilian municipalities a relatively simple opportunity to increase their ownsource fiscal effort. Given this context, I ask if it is possible to identify systematic factors that
contribute to the adoption of the policy. If such factors do exist, are they primarily a result of a
municipality’s calculation of need for revenues and public lighting expenditures? Does political
leadership, opposition strength, or ideology matter? Might adoption of this own-source revenue
be due to the influence of the experience of other municipalities? These factors are tested in a
comprehensive model to examine their contribution to the decision to adopt COSIP.
4.3.2 Factors in the Adoption of COSIP
A municipality’s adoption of COSIP, an own-revenue source earmarked for public lighting,
might be explained by three broad categories of factors: revenue need, politics, and diffusion.
The most obvious is a need for revenue. This need could arise because market conditions favor
an increase in the equilibrium quantity of public service, or because COSIP can compensate for
shortfalls elsewhere in the budget. Since the adoption decision is made by political institutions,
one could expect the nature of the institution and political leadership would affect the likelihood
that new taxes are be adopted. Finally, local governments might be influenced by the adoption
of a tax in nearby municipalities. This last category is typically studied under the rubric of policy
diffusion.
Revenue need arises from an imbalance between revenues and a desired level of public service
provision. One way to think about this is to imagine that two municipalities have a similar level
of revenues and provide the same levels of public services. However, one municipality develops
a higher demand for the service or a more efficient supply of the service. In this case, a
relatively larger gap will emerge between the amount of the service provided and the amount of
service demanded. An under-provision of goods will result, and the municipality will seek
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additional revenue to meet that need. While we do not have information on the quantity of
public lighting demanded in each Brazilian municipality, we can test demand-related factors as is
typically done in the public finance literature. Population, income, and demographics are
standard candidates. In the case of public lighting, it also makes sense that demand would be
affected by the land area of the urban centers and the distribution of the population between the
urban conglomerations and rural areas. We can also proxy for demand using prior levels of
public lighting, where a municipality with levels well below what would be expected given its
population, size, and other control factors should have a higher demand for public lighting.
Likewise with the supply of the service, we do not know how much public lighting would be
supplied at a given spending level. Cost-factors that are likely to significantly affect the supply
include the price of electricity and regional labor costs. The number of urban centers within a
municipality is also likely to affect cost of provision, since the light company suffers cost
inefficiencies from having to service many small conglomerations rather than one large one.
Larger distances between the urban centers also likely contributes to higher service costs. Where
demand factors are relatively higher (all else equal) or supply factors are more favorable (all else
equal), we should expect to see a larger desire for revenue and a higher likelihood of adopting
COSIP.
Revenue need is also affected by a municipality’s spending on services other than public
lighting. Higher spending, given a fixed level of public revenues, leads to larger budget deficits.
Brazilian municipalities face sanctions from the federal government if their balance sheets
deteriorate too much. A mayor confronting a precarious budget situation would do well to adopt
COSIP, even if the municipality did not need that money for additional public lighting. To the
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extent that the mayor is already spending on public lighting, he may divert those funds for other
purposes and replace them with the COSIP revenues.
Political institutions and leadership attributes in a municipality might affect the likelihood of
COSIP adoption. Mayors that are ideologically left might be more reticent to impose additional
taxes on the consumption of electricity, since consumption taxes are typically understood to be
regressive. Mayors that are more fiscally conservative might push the tax to achieve a more
balanced budget. There is a great deal of homogeneity in formal institutions for the budget and
tax process in Brazilian municipalities, since they are defined in the constitution. One factor that
has been found to be important for the adoption of new legislation is the number of veto points
(Tsebelis, 2002). In Brazilian municipalities, one manifestation of this exists in the form of
opposition councilors, who are able to block legislation. For that reason, it is worthwhile to
compare the importance of the number of opposition members in the legislature during the times
of non-adoption and of adoption.
Finally, the adoption of the tax might be influenced by the activities of neighboring
municipalities. There are many examples where analysis finds neighborhood policy effects, but
one must be careful to separate “influence” from “common contextual effects (Braun & Gilardi,
2006).” A finding of neighborhood influence often raises the question as to the mechanism by
which the influence occurred. In their study of the diffusion of anti-smoking policies, (Shipan &
Volden, 2008) cite four mechanisms that they call learning, economic competition, imitation, and
coercion. Their concept of learning is quite general, but Braun and Gilardi usefully formalized it
as ”the acquisition of new relevant information that permits the updating of beliefs about the
effects of a new policy (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, p306).” This is distinct from learning about
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policy advocacy (which arguments work best) and policy implementation (which policy structure
works best), but for Shipan and Volden it is part of the “learning” package.
In the public budgeting literature, (Sjoquist, Smith, Walker, & Wallace, 2007) separate diffusion
mechanisms into spillover effects, tax competition, and copycat behavior. The first two could
easily be grouped into the “economic competition” mechanism in the Shipan and Volden
typology, and the copycat behavior is quite clearly imitation. It is difficult to see how the
adoption of public lighting might be a matter of municipal competition, since this tax is imposed
on the relatively immobile tax base of residential and commercial electricity connections, and it
is just one tax in a list of many others. It is also unlikely that adoption of the COSIP is owed to
coercion, since Brazilian municipalities are formally independent and generally left to their own
devices on matters such as public lighting. Adoption of the COSIP could be due to “learning,” in
the sense described above. We might expect municipal governments look to their neighbors to
evaluate the political fallout and the policy achievements of COSIP adoption. Adoption of the
policy amongst one’s neighbors has two distinct learning effects. First, it introduces the
municipality to the notion that this policy exists and is potentially a reasonable and rational thing
to do (awareness). Second, it provides an opportunity for the municipality to learn about the
details of policy implementation (evaluation). As more neighbors adopt the tax, awareness rises
and pressure mounts on the administration to go along with the neighbors and adopt the tax.
However, additional adoption also provides local governments with the opportunity to evaluate
the experience of the earlier adopters. As one might expect with tax initiatives, they are likely to
be contentious until the administration proves that they are able to use the new revenues
effectively.
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4.4 DATA
I evaluate the relative influence of revenue need, politics and diffusion on the likelihood of
policy uptake in the four years immediately following the constitutional amendment at the end of
2002. It was during this time that there was a flurry of adoption activity, with 1,370
municipalities choosing to implement the lighting tax. I rely on the Brazilian Census Bureau’s
survey of municipalities to flag whether a municipality had a light tax in a given year (IBGE,
2013), and adoption is inferred when a municipality transitioned from a negative to positive
status regarding tax implementation. Also known as the “Profile of Municipalities,” the IBGE’s
survey instrument asks a wide range of questions regarding administrative practices. It
consistently inquires whether the city has a lighting tax, and has been tracking this information
prior to the adoption of the lighting tax amendment in the end of 2002. As discussed above,
many municipalities had already instituted some kind of public lighting tax by the time the
amendment, so they are not included in the analysis. Observations for most municipalities are
available in 2002, 2004, 2005 & 2006, the years in which there was rapid uptake of the tax. To
infer whether a city adopted the tax during this time window, I examine whether municipalities
that had not adopted as of 2002 had adopted as of 2006. For a small group a municipalities that
did not appear in the 2006 survey, I used their 2005 adoption status.
Table 4.1 shows the number of municipalities in the dataset by their tax adoption status in a
given year. There were 5,390 municipalities with observations in the 2002 profile. Of these,
2,648 already had a lighting tax in 2002, and 2,742 did not. Of the municipalities that had not
adopted as of 2002, 1,370 of them had instituted the lighting tax by 2006, which is a 50% rate of
adoption. 47.3% of the same population did not adopt during the four year window, and 2.7% of
these municipalities did not have data available.
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Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the population of municipalities that had not
adopted as of 2002. For example, the city of São Paulo is not in this sample, since it adopted a
light tax prior to December 2002. The lighting tax was adopted by 1370 of the 2667 observed
municipalities, which means is a 51% adoption rate56. The values used for the independent
variables are the mean values over the 2002-2006 timeframe. The largest city in this population
is Rio de Janeiro, with over 6 million inhabitants. Six other cities with over 1 million residents
had not adopted as of 2002. The analysis was conducted with and without these observations,
but results did not differ significantly so these cities are included in the descriptive and
multivariate analysis57.
Table 4.3 shows the units of the variables as they appear in the descriptive statistics table and in
the multivariate model below. Many of the variables are logged for inclusion in the multivariate
model, some are in percent (from 0 to 100), and a few are indicator variables coded as either one
or zero.
The data for lighting tax adoption come from the Brazilian Census Bureau’s annual “Profile of
Municipalities.” (IBGE, 2013). Data on GDP, Population, and Municipal Geographic area are
from IBGE (IBGE, 2012, 2014). Urban land area was computed and made available through a
project sponsored by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Association (Embrapa) (Miranda,
Gomes, & Guimarães, 2005). Microdata on the availability of public lighting in 2000 was
collected as part of the 2000 census. Each examiner recorded whether a home had public
lighting in its vicinity (IBGE, 2000). I summarize this measure at the municipal level by

56

The 2667 number is equal to the count of municipalities (2,742) that had not yet adopted the tax in 2002 minus
the number of these municipalities (75) that were not available in the 2006 dataset.
57
The large cities that were tested as outliers are Rio de Janeiro, RJ; Belo Horizonte, MG; Curitiba, PR; Porto Alegre,
RS; Guarulhos, SP; Goiania, GO; and Campinas, SP.
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calculating the proportion of surveyed homes in a municipality that were located in
neighborhoods with public lighting in the year 2000, two years prior to the beginning of the
lighting tax adoption window. Municipal revenue and expenditure information is from the
Brazilian Public Finance dataset published by the Ministry of Finance (Brazil National Treasury,
2013). It is interesting to note that the average budget position was 99%, meaning the average
municipality spent about 99% of its total revenues over this time frame. All data on political
variables is from the Federal Electoral Authority (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) do Brasil,
2015).
Figure 4-2 shows the timing of the lighting tax implementation during the adoption window. Of
the 2667 municipalities that had not adopted as of 2002, 1370 of them had adopted the tax by
2006, which left 1297 municipalities that had not yet adopted the tax. The Brazilian Census
Bureau (IBGE) did not administer the survey every year.

During the adoption window, the

survey was completed in every year except for in 2003, which is the reason for the fact that 2003
is missing from Figure 4-2. Some of the adoptions that appear to have occurred in 2004 likely
took place in 2003. The dependent variable in the model is a binary adoption indicator, so the
exact timing of policy uptake is not critical to the analysis.

4.5 MODEL
I approach the analysis by modeling adoption in a conventional logit framework. The
ⅇ𝑣

probability of adoption is a function, 𝐹(𝑉) = 1+ⅇ 𝑣 , of a linear combination of factors. The
model is:
PR(Adoption𝑖 ) = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑊𝑖 𝛼 + 𝑍𝑖 𝛾 + 𝜃𝑟 )
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(1)

Adoption𝑖 is coded as true if a municipality adopted the lighting tax in the 2002 to 2006
timeframe, false if they did not adopt over this period, and null if they had adopted prior to 2002,
thereby being excluded from the model. There are four classes of independent variables, denoted
as X, W, Z, and 𝜃 in the above equation. 𝑋𝑖 is composed of the “revenue-need” variables. The
model’s X contains the demand factors: municipal GDP per capita, population size, public
lighting availability immediately prior to the adoption window, the land area within a
municipality that is “urbanized”, and the land area of the entire municipality (Miranda et al.,
2005). The public lighting supply factors such as wage levels and electricity prices are not
included, but they should be relatively uniform on a regional basis, and would thus be addressed
by the model specification with fixed effects. Revenue-need factors that are the result of budget
tie-in are also contained in X. This includes total municipal revenues less contributions58, and
the budget position (spending as a percent of revenues). All the values in X vary somewhat by
year, and so their average values over the adoption timeframe was used in this cross-sectional
model.
W contains political leadership and institutional variables. It includes a dummy variable to
indicate whether the mayor is affiliated with a classic liberal party or with the most cohesive left
party - the workers party (PT). W also contains a measure for the amount of institutional friction
caused by opposition presence in the legislature: the percentage of legislators that were elected
from outside the Mayor’s coalition (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) do Brasil, 2015).

58

COSIP is a contribution, and figures into the revenue accounts as such. It is typically a large part or the whole
part of this account, so subtracting contributions from revenue is a way to estimate non-COSIP revenues.

127

Z holds the diffusion variable, which is intended to proxy the “learning” concept as laid out in
Shipan and Volden. It is the percentage of neighboring municipalities in a micro-region that
were using COSIP in the year prior to a municipality’s adoption of COSIP.
The model contains the term 𝜃𝑟 , which represents area fixed effects for a micro-region.
Microregions are sub-divisions within states, defined by the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE).
Claims about causality in this model hinge on the extent to which we believe that all necessary
covariates are included. Public lighting provision, wealth, and political culture are likely to vary
regionally. To capture this regional heterogeneity, I include regional fixed effects to control for
slow-changing unobserved differences, including for regional market variables such as electricity
and labor prices. The regional fixed effects also address political variables that have regional
ubiquity such as political culture or social conditions. There are sufficient observations available
in this dataset for regional fixed effects. Altogether there are 556 microregions in Brazil. Figure
4-3 shows the number of municipalities in each microregion. It is most common for a
microregion to contain between 5 and 10 municipalities, but there are several regions with up to
20 municipalities. Using regional fixed effects means that useful variation in the model’s righthand-side variables comes from temporal change and cross-sectional differences between
municipalities only within the same region. The fact that the number of municipalities in each
micro-regions is small means that the cross sectional variation employed by the model is
substantially circumscribed. While not perfect, this approach goes a long way towards
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and thus limits concerns over policy endogeneity.
The goal of the model proposed in this paper is to test explanations in a comprehensive model
specification as a way to evaluate their strength while controlling for the other explanations.
Identification relies on two arguments. First is a theoretical argument that all relevant variables
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have been included in the model. The safest way to view the model is one of covariates, with a
broad set of theoretically motivated controls. Second, the case for identification is helped
through the use of regional fixed effects to control for slow-moving factors in an entire region.
The estimates are also compared across multiple specifications to test their stability.

4.6 RESULTS
There is evidence that several of the factors are closely associated with policy adoption. Among
the most important of these include a municipality’s size, sources of alternative revenues, a
strong political opposition, and the influence of nearby municipalities. All variable classes
(economic need, politics, and network effects) appear to be associated with the decision to adopt
a tax. Perhaps just as important as discovering factors that are associated with adoption is the
fact that there is significant room for improvement in the model. While the list of model factors
is quite comprehensive, there are several factors beyond the usual suspects that influenced the
decision to adopt the lighting tax.
Model estimates and marginal effects appear in Table 4.4. I present two model specifications;
one without and one with micro region fixed effects. The logit coefficient estimates are listed in
the last two columns, and the marginal effects for the average municipality appear in the left two
columns59. Point estimates of the coefficients appear above their robust standard errors, in
parentheses. The coefficients are reasonably stable across the two specifications, which
increases our confidence that the marginal effects are reliable approximations of the partial
relationships between the independent and dependent variables.

59

Marginal effects are calculated for the mean value of each independent variable. For factors with log
transformations, the mean value is the average of the logged value.
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Several estimates merit consideration. A municipality’s population is a strong predictor of the
city’s propensity to adopt a lighting tax. The model is based on the log of population, and the
estimate is that a 1% increase in population is associated with a 0.23 percentage point increase in
the probability of a lighting tax. It’s not uncommon for Brazilian cities to grow at a 5% annual
rate. Taken literally, this estimate suggests that each year a city experiencing stable 5% growth
would, all else equal, increase its chances of adopting the tax by around 1% per year. Since the
estimate is based off of a cross-sectional sample, the results stem from the fact that larger cities
are more likely to adopt the tax. Despite a strong positive relationship between population and
tax adoption, there were other factors in play. Several small municipalities that chose to adopt,
and multiple large cities that avoided levying the tax. Another “need” factor is the availability of
alternative revenue sources. The relationship is negative, with the estimate showing that a 1%
increase in other revenue sources is associated with a reduction in the probability of adoption by
0.21 percentage points. Revenues are all measured in terms of 2010 real value. Annual
increases (in real terms) vary significantly depending on the state of the national economy and
federal tax collection, but even a large increase of 5%-10%, which was common during the
boom years of the mid 2000s, would be roughly associated with an increase of only 1 to 2 points
in the probability of adoption. This is not a particularly large effect, considering the fact that 5%
of a municipal budget can easily amount to a million Reais, or jobs for a hundred people. Figure
4-4 shows the predicted probability of adoption given a municipality’s population60. The solid
gray line uses actual data, and the dashed orange line is the predicted adoption rate for the same
municipalities with 5% lower revenues. The dollar amount of this revenue shortfall is shown by
the dotted line (right axis). For example, a municipality with 30,000 people (and otherwise

60

These simulation charts are based on Model (1), since the coefficients are roughly similar and it is estimated for
nearly all of the observations in the population of interest.
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average) had an expected probability of adoption of 0.6. A loss in 5% of revenue for this
municipality would be approximately R$ 600,000, and that would be associated with a 1
percentage point higher probability of adoption. The model and magnitude of the estimate
shows that while an administration’s decision to adopt the tax is unmistakably influenced by a
need for revenue, it is not an overwhelming decision-factor.
Increases in the chance of adoption are associated with more public lighting in 2000, prior to the
adoption window. This likely captures an endogenous relationship, where municipalities that
were previously good at providing public lighting were more likely to adopt the tax. Note that a
zero or positive coefficient on this factor is evidence against the argument that mayors in laggard
municipalities adopted the tax to close a “public lighting gap.” If that had been the case, the
coefficient would have been negative: previously low levels of public lighting would be
associated with a higher rate of adoption.
Stronger opposition in the municipal legislature is associated with a lower rate of policy
adoption. The magnitude of this effect is substantial, where a 10 percentage point increase in
opposition increases the expected probability of adoption by 0.02 percentage points. Large
fluctuations in the political composition of a municipal legislature is a fact of local Brazilian
government. Figure 4-5 shows how an increase of the opposition by 20 percentage points leads
to a change in the probability of policy adoption across population levels. That is, an opposition
with 20 percentage points more seats in the legislature is associated with a 5 percentage point
reduction in the probability of policy adoption. There are likely some threshold effects in this
relationship, not modeled here. Nevertheless, this analysis strongly supports the notion that a
robust opposition is associated with slower policy adoption, for better or worse.
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Finally, the proportion of a municipality’s neighbors that already had the tax in 2002 was
associated with higher rates of adoption. The direction and magnitude is robust to the inclusion
of regional fixed effects, suggesting that the result is not due purely to regional patterns of
adoption. Adoption within microregions in 2002 ranged widely from 0 percent to 100% with a
fairly uniform distribution. Figure 4-6 shows the increase in probability of adoption associated
with a 20 and 50 percentage point increase in policy uptake of neighboring municipalities. If the
proportion of nearby municipalities with the policy increased by 20 percentage points, this would
be associated with an increase of 5 percentage points in the probability of adoption. With 50
percentage points higher adoption rate, a municipality would be 10 points more likely to
implement the new tax policy. These effects are large, though they diminish as more nearby
municipalities adopt the policy.

4.7 CONCLUSION
Many local governments in developing countries are highly dependent on intergovernmental
transfers. The benefits of this arrangement are many and varied. Countries can take advantage
of economies of scale in tax administration, the central government can use disbursements to
maintain control over local governments and to bolster anticorruption efforts. Developing
countries can also distribute resources across regions to address large income disparities within
the country. However, recent academic literature has increasingly found virtue in increasing the
fiscal effort of local governments. The fiscal link between citizens and their government is
important because it appears to contribute to more efficient allocation of resources and a more
accountable government. Since the adoption of own-source revenue is a decision that often must
be made by local governments, its adoption is all but assured. Politicians are typically loath to
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increase taxes, so the politics of fiscal effort become an important problem that merits policy and
academic attention.
This paper examines several potential factors in local Brazilian governments’ decisions to adopt
a low-cost public lighting tax. Using a comprehensive model that includes fiscal, political, and
neighborhood factors, I find that the most important factors in adoption are the size of the city,
the availability of alternate revenues, the absence of a strong political opposition, and policy
uptake among neighboring municipalities. The estimates are robust to specification with microregional fixed effects, which suggests that these relationships hold across the country and are not
merely a reflection of regional differences.
Several interesting results emerge from the analysis. First, while the availability of other public
revenues is associated with an identifiable increase in the probability of tax adoption, its
influence is not particularly strong. Municipalities with lower public revenues (conditional on
the other factors) were only marginally more likely to adopt the lighting tax. Similarly, the
availability of public lighting prior to the tax adoption period showed a positive or no
relationship with the likelihood of adoption. These observations are evidence against simple
claims that the tax was adopted purely to raise revenue, or purely for historically disadvantaged
municipalities to catch up in terms of public lighting service.
The size of the legislative opposition and the number of nearby municipalities that had the tax in
2002, prior to the adoption window, were particularly influential factors. A twenty percentage
point increase in the proportion of opposition legislators translated into a decreased probability
of adoption of 5 percentage points. Meanwhile, a twenty percentage point increase in the
neighborhood adoption rate was associated with a 6 percentage point rise in the probability of
adoption, even when controlling for diverse regional variation.
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Some of these factors are relevant for policy considerations. Legislative opposition is not a
feasible point of intervention, but network effects between neighboring municipalities appears to
be a promising mechanism for introducing local governments to this policy option. Policies that
raise the tax capacity of regional leaders and that facilitate the sharing of these experiences
would fit with the findings of the research presented here. Overall, the Brazilian experience with
the lighting tax and other efforts to increase the tax collection efforts of local governments has
demonstrated progress towards a healthier fiscal relationship between citizens and the providers
of their public services.
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4.8 FIGURES

Figure 4-1: Percentage of Munis with Light Tax, 2002 to 2012
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Figure 4-2: Adoption of Cosip Light Tax, 2004 to 2006

Figure 4-3: Distribution of Number of Municipalities in each MicroRegion
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Brazilian Municipal Adoption of Lighting Tax
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Figure 4-4: Adoption by Population & Shortfall in Alternative Revenues
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Figure 4-5: Probability of Adoption: Legislative Opposition
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Brazilian Municipal Adoption of Lighting Tax
Given Changes to Neighborhood Adoption
.85
.8
.75
.7
.65
.6
.55
0

20,000

40,000
60,000
Population

80,000

100,000

Expected Probability of Adoption, Actual
Expected Probability of Adoption, with Neighbors Pct +20pp
Expected Probability of Adoption, with Neighbors Pct +50pp

Figure 4-6: Probability of Adoption - Neighborhood Uptake
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4.9 TABLES
Lighting Tax Adoption Status of Brazilian Municipalities
Tax in 2006
No
Yes
Unknown Total
1,297
1,370
75
2,742
Tax in 2002 No
Yes
275
2,334
39
2,648
Unknown 0
0
163
163
Total
1,572
3,704
277
5,553
Source: Perfíl dos Municípios

Table 4.1: Lighting Tax Adoption Status of Brazilian Municipalities, 2002-2006

Descriptive Statistics for BR Munis without Light Tax in 2002
count mean
sd
min
2667 51%
0.50
0
Adopted
2667 7,117 9,231
1,060
GDP per Capita
2667 28,973 148,131 816
Population
2667 18,400 121,000 1,625
Non COSIP Revenue (Th)
2667 99.04 4.05
76.29
Budget Position
2629 67.51 21.86
1.83
Public Lighting in 2000
2628 3.57
18.03
0.01
Urban Land Area
2667 1,485 5,112
3.57
Muni Geographic Area
2667 0.38
0.38
0
Liberal Party Mayor
2667 0.08
0.21
0
Left Party Mayor
2638 45.80 18.88
0
Opposition %
0
Neighborhood Adoption Pct 2667 31.41 22.74

max
1
178,917
6,038,714
5,120,000
122.98
100.00
557.38
107,603
1
1
100.00
92.86

See Table 4.3 for a description of units.

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for BR Munis that did not have a light tax in 2002

139

Variable Descriptions and Units
Units
Units in Models
Variable
Proportion
Yes/No
Adoption
Years
Years to Adoption
R$ 2010
Log R$ 2010
GDP per Capita
People
Log People
Population
R$ 2010 (Th)
Log R$ 2010
Non COSIP Revenue
Spending as Percent of Receipts
Budget Position
Proportion of Homes with Public Lighting
Public Lighting in 2000
Km2
Log Km2
Urban Land Area
Km2
Log Km2
Muni Geographic Area
1 if Mayor from PSDB, PFL/DEM, PSL, PP, PSD
Liberal Party Mayor
1 if Mayor from PT
PT Party Mayor
1 if Mayor from PT,PSB,PCdoB
Left Party Mayor
Years
NA
Mayor Education
Years
NA
Mayor Age
Percent
Opposition Pct in Legislature
Percent
Neighborhood Adoption Pct
Table 4.3: Variable Descriptions and Units
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Probability of Adoption of COSIP Lighting Tax
Marginal Effects
(1)
(2)
0.038*
-0.036
GDP per Capita
(0.022)
(0.051)
0.228***
0.275***
Population
(0.037)
(0.056)
-0.216***
-0.269***
Non COSIP Revenue
(0.044)
(0.070)
-0.003
0.005
Prior Budget Position
(0.003)
(0.004)
0.000
0.003***
Public Lighting in 2000
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.007
0.001
Urban Land Area
(0.015)
(0.020)
0.017*
0.042*
Muni Geographic Area
(0.009)
(0.024)
-0.077***
-0.002
Liberal Party Mayor
(0.028)
(0.038)
0.053
0.050
Left Party Mayor
(0.051)
(0.071)
-0.002***
-0.003***
Opposition %
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.004***
0.006
Neighborhood Adoption Pct
(0.000)
(0.007)
Constant
N
Microregion FEs

2600
No

2134
Yes

Logit Coefficients
(1)
(2)
0.152*
-0.147
(0.087)
(0.203)
0.912***
1.107***
(0.149)
(0.227)
-0.863*** -1.081***
(0.176)
(0.282)
-0.012
0.020
(0.011)
(0.016)
0.001
0.014***
(0.002)
(0.004)
0.026
0.005
(0.060)
(0.082)
0.066*
0.168*
(0.036)
(0.095)
-0.308*** -0.006
(0.113)
(0.154)
0.212
0.202
(0.206)
(0.284)
-0.009*** -0.011***
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.017***
0.025
(0.002)
(0.029)
4.449**
4.144
(1.800)
(2.989)
2600
2134
No
Yes

The dependent variable is adoption of COSIP Light tax. Values in parentheses are standard errors. Marginal Effects
and Logit Coefficients are given for both model (1) and model (2), which is identical to model (1) except it adds
microregion fixed effects. Logged variables include gdp per capita, population, non cosip revenues and km2 of
municipality. Marginal Effects are taken at the averages of the logged variables.

Table 4.4: Probability of Adoption of COSIP Lighting Tax
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